Construction of Binary Oppositions in War Reportage: A Case Study of the Media Coverage of the 2014 Gaza War by Duong , Yen Do Bao
 UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
Faculty of Philosophy 
ICS-programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yen Duong Do Bao 
 
Construction of Binary Oppositions in War Reportage 
A Case Study of the Media Coverage of the 2014 Gaza War 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis 
Vaasa 2016  
1 	
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
FIGURES AND TABLES  2 
ABSTRACT  5 
1 INTRODUCTION 7 
 1.1 Background 8 
 1.2 The War, the Media and Public Opinions 10 
 1.3 Research Aims, Questions and Methods 13 
 1.4 Structure of the Thesis 17 
  
2 MASS MEDIA COVERING CONFLICT  18 
 2.1 The Role of Media in Conflict 18 
 2.2 The Media Coverage of the Israel-Palestine Conflict(s) 21
  
3 HEGEMONY AND DISCOURSE 25 
 3.1 The Binary Construction of Differences 25 
 3.2 Ideology, Hegemony and Discourse 29
  
4 WAR JOURNALISM AND PEACE JOURNALISM 33 
 4.1 Conflict Theory, Conflict Formation and Conflict Transformation 33 
 4.2 What is Peace Journalism?   36 
 4.3 Critiques of Peace Journalism  40 
5 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 44 
 5.1 Data 44 
                  5.1.1 Haaretz and CNN  46 
                  5.1.2 Data Collection 50 
 5.2 Critical Discourse Analysis 53 
       5.2.1 Aims and Ethics of Critical Discourse Analysis  54 
2 	
       5.2.2 Theoretical and Methodological Framework  56 
  
6 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 62 
6.1 Editorial Preferences 62 
6.2 Onset of the War  64 
                  6.2.1 Thematic and Schematic Structure Analysis of CNN’s Article         65 
      6.2.2 Thematic and Schematic Structure Analysis of Haaretz’s Article          74 
6.3 The Battle of Shuja’iyya 81 
6.4 Rhetoric of Terrorist Stronghold: When is a House not a Home?  91 
6.5 Hamas 100 
 
7 CONCLUSION 116 
WORKS CITED 122 
APPENDICES  
Appendix 1. Screenshots of the Layout of CNN’s Article  134 
Appendix 2. IDF’s Propaganda Poster, “When is a House a Home?” 135 
Appendix 3. IDF’s Propaganda Poster, “Inside Shuja’iyya” 136 
 
FIGURES 
Figure 1. The ABC Conflict Triangle 33 
Figure 2. Order of the News Schemata 58 
 
DIAGRAMS 
Diagram 1. Israeli Public Opinion on the Use of IDF’s Firepower in Gaza 11 
Diagram 2. American Public Opinion on Israel’s Military Actions in Gaza 12 
Diagram 3. Haaretz’s and CNN’s Positions during the Gaza War 2014 45 
Diagram 4. Schema of CNN’s News Report 73 
Diagram 5. Schema of Haaretz’s News Report 79 
3 	
TABLES 
Table 1. Peace/Conflict Journalism versus War/Violence Journalism 39 
Table 2. Data Collection and Dimensions of Analysis  52 
Table 3. Number of News Articles relating to the War published on Both Outlets  63 
   during Phase One of the Operation  
Table 4. Headlines of CNN’s Article 67 
Table 5. Thematic Structure of CNN’s News Report 69 
Table 6. Thematic Structure of Haaretz’s News Report 76 
Table 7. Topics of CNN’s and Haaretz’s News Articles on Shuja’iyya 82 
Table 8. Lexicon describing Target Sites of Bombardment 92 
Table 9. Lexicon describing Hamas and their Members  101 
Table 10. Hamas’ Goals of the 2014 Gaza War  105 
 
PICTURES 
Picture 1. Screenshots of Parts of CNN’s Article 66 
Picture 2. Screenshot of CNN’s Story Highlights and Their Thematic Categories 68 
Picture 3. Screenshot of Search Results using Keywords “Operation Protective Edge”  74 
     from July 7 to July 8, 2014 on Haaretz 
Picture 4. Image of Shuja’iyya in Haaretz’s Article 88 
Picture 5. Screenshot of the Main Video of CNN’s Article 89 
Picture 6. Image of Hamas in Haaretz’s Article 110 
Picture 7. Screenshot of CNN’s Main Video on Hamas 110 
Picture 8. Screenshot of CNN’s Main Video on Hamas 112 
Picture 9. Image of Khaled Meshal on Haaretz 113 
Picture 10. Screenshot of a Part of CNN’s Article 114 
Picture 11. Screenshot of Video featuring Khaled Meshal on CNN 114 
 
 
 
 
4 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5 	
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
Faculty of Philosophy 
Programme: 
Author: 
Master's thesis: 
 
Degree: 
Date: 
Supervisor: 
ICS 
Yen Duong Do Bao 
Construction of Binary Oppositions in War Reportage 
A Case Study of the Media Coverage of the 2014 Gaza War 
Master of Arts 
2016 
Daniel Rellstab 
ABSTRACT 
 
One of the typical characteristics of war/violence-oriented journalism is to represent 
warring parties in binary oppositions. The purpose is to justify violence, which turns every 
act of the Self into a defense mechanism, while that of the Enemy into intimidation, a 
violation, a threat. This approach is common in mainstream reportage of wars and conflicts, 
in which an excessive amount of attention is paid to the duel between the assumed two 
sides of the war, indicating a news value bias towards negativity and violence. On the other 
hand, stories about the background, the context leading to the war, conflict transformation, 
peace resolutions, the invisible and visible effects that the war can impose on the lives of 
civilians receive relatively less exposure. These debates are central to the theory of peace 
journalism.  
 
Premised on Johan Galtung’s concept of peace journalism, this study aims to question the 
role of the media in the Israel–Gaza war 2014. The data are twelve articles retrieved from 
the online archives of two news outlets, Haaretz and CNN. The study focuses on their 
representations of conflict actors and events that took place during the war, specifically in 
terms of four topics: the onset of the war, the battle of Shuja’iyya, the rhetoric of terrorist 
stronghold, and lastly, Hamas. The study employs Teun van Dijk’s framework of Critical 
Discourse Analysis, with an emphasis on the macrosemantic structure and dimensions of 
discourse semantics including perspectives, lexical choices and propositional structures. 
The study also takes into consideration the uses of multimodal texts such as images and 
videos, as well as their compositional patterns within the articles.  
 
The analyses reveal that there is an imbalance in reporting, especially in terms of 
perspectives, as Israeli official narratives of the war are predominant in the news 
discourses. Hamas, one of the main conflict actors, by contrast, often appears in a trove of 
antagonistic representations that are based on preconception and bias towards the 
organization. The two news outlets also display a difference in their approaches to the 
news. While a large portion of CNN’s content is devoted to the confrontation and exchange 
of fires between Hamas and Israel, Haaretz proves to be more creative in terms of 
perspectives. Additionally, by including a number of articles that propose solutions and 
alternatives to the conflict, the latter implies an effort to find peace and put an end to the 
war. The practice of Haaretz demonstrates that violence-oriented reportage is avoidable.  
KEYWORDS: Media, war reportage, peace journalism, binary construction, hegemony 
6 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7 	
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Reporting war has never been the easiest task. Broken houses, uprooted trees, graphic 
images of the dead and the wounded are all abridged on a few lines of breaking news 
reports. If facts form the basis of it all, why does the same war incite varied attitudes and 
polarized sides? Physical documentation of war has always been a question of “politicized 
facts” (Nordstrom 1997: 45), which may explain why the images of war can appear so 
black and white when they are in the newspapers. Over the past five decades, despite many 
wars that have been waged, the Israel–Palestine conflict has never ceased to be a source of 
controversy that has to do more with politics than with actual atrocities. Once again, 
airstrikes fell on both sides of the disputed land. These are the same images and this is the 
same war. Reporting the Israel–Palestine conflict has somewhat become a yearly routine, 
sufferings reduced to numbers, history repeating itself. 
 
Between July 8 and August 26, 2014, Israel conducted a military campaign against Hamas 
and other Palestinian armed groups in the Gaza Strip, codenamed “Operation Protective 
Edge”. Within the course of fifty days, thousands of air raids and tank projectiles targeted 
one of the most densely populated areas in the world. Though figures vary and remain 
disputed1, the United Nations (UN) Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza 
conflict estimates a number of 2,251 Palestinians killed, including 1,462 civilians, a third of 
which were children (UNHRC 2015: 6). Israel also records a death toll of 73, with six 
civilians killed (ibid. 6). The 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict has thus become one of the 
deadliest for both sides, in which most death counts remain those of civilians. Being longer 
and more destructive than any other previous military operation to date, operation 
Protective Edge attracted extensive media attention. One side fired, the other responded, the 
endless wrangle surrounding the conflict also triggered disputes on the media covering the 
war. If during operation Cast Lead from 2008 to 2009, international journalists had been 
                                                
1 Israeli government’s official statistics stand at 2,125 Palestinian fatalities in the Gaza strip, with 44% (936) 
alleged as militants while 36% (761) assumed as civilians (State of Israel 2015: 2).  	
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barred from Gaza throughout the military operation, they were however allowed to enter 
the Gaza Strip during the 2014 war (Malsin 2014). Operation Protective Edge proves to 
have drawn great media attention, as the number of foreign journalists covering the 2014 
conflict in Gaza doubles that of previous Israeli military operations (Tucker 2014). Despite 
the voluminous coverage, much criticism was weighed against the press for being biased, 
for being one-sided.  
 
In the face of lethality and violence, what role do the media play, particularly in stages 
before, during and after the war? The June 2015 report by the UN Independent Commission 
has found evidence of possible war crimes committed by both Israeli and Palestinian armed 
groups, condemning excessive uses of artillery and precision-guided missiles in residential 
areas (UNHRC 2015: 19). The legitimacy of this war has then been taken into 
consideration. In that regard, the works of the media covering the war should also be 
reconsidered. In the end, all of these attacks against media bias seem to overlook one 
question: Were the media mediating or promoting the war?  
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Confusion over the prelude to wars and conflicts has been common in mainstream 
reportage (Boyd-Barrett 2004: 28). The danger of this failing, however, is grave. It affects 
how the war is read once surfaced to the mass audience, how it is justified as an act of self-
defense rather than atrocities committed against civilians (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014: 15). 
Narratives of the context leading to the 2014 Gaza war have been numerous, as each side 
seeks to tell the story in their own way. As a result, it is necessary to contextualize the war 
within a big picture, meaning that it should not be interpreted as a single event but a 
combination of a sequence of events that escalated into an armed conflict.  
 
According to an official report released last May by the Israeli government, Hamas’ 
increasing rockets and mortal launches into Israel from June to July 2014 form the setting 
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of the military operations (State of Israel 2015: x). The discovery of a number of Hamas’ 
underground cross-border tunnels into Israel only intensified the situation. Within the same 
period, on June 12, three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped while hitchhiking in Alon Shvut, 
an Israeli settlement southwest of Jerusalem. On the following day, the Israeli Defense 
Force (IDF) immediately embarked on the operation “Brother’s Keeper” for an intensive 
search of the three missing teenagers (Booth and Eglash 2014; Cohen, et al. 2014). The 
target of operation “Brother’s Keeper” was no doubt Hamas, whom Israeli President 
Benjamin Netanyahu quickly blamed as the culprit behind the abduction, despite the fact 
that there was no evidence backing his claim at the time (Sharon 2014). Ten days into the 
operation, IDF rounded up hundreds of Palestinians residing in the West Bank, the majority 
of whom were officials and senior members of Hamas (Norman 2014; Times of Israel 
2014). On June 30, the bodies of the three Israeli youths were found northwest of Hebron, 
and posthumous examination showed that they were killed shortly after their abduction. 
Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to take a tough response for the murders. 
(Beaumont and Crowcroft 2014) 
 
Shortly after the incident, Israel launched operation “Protective Edge”, IDF’s military 
maneuvers in Gaza, on July 8, 2014. Israeli government’s official statement of operation 
“Protective Edge” blames the intensified rockets from Hamas and other Gaza-based armed 
organizations as leaving it with “no choice but to launch an aerial campaign” into the Gaza 
Strip so as to protect Israeli civilians (State of Israel 2015: x). There were nevertheless far 
too many questions clouding the idea that these events were the catalyst for the war that 
broke out in summer 2014. The story might go back as far as March 2014, when Benjamin 
Netanyahu decided to retract his commitment with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas 
to release twenty-six Palestinian and Israeli Arab prisoners detained since before the 1993 
Oslo Accords, when Abbas refused to revoke plans to pursuit Palestine’s statehood before 
the Hague International court (Derfner 2014). Failure in the nine-month peace talks with 
the United States since late 2013, loomed by Netanyahu’s advance in settlement activities 
in the West Bank and withdrawal of the deal, led Abbas to seek alternatives. On June 2, 
2014, the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, also leader of 
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Fatah, signed a Gaza agreement with Hamas in an attempt for reconciliation after almost a 
decade of internal political division (Power and van Hoydoonk 2015). 
 
Angered by this decision, Netanyahu publicly condemned Abbas and his intention to form a 
transitional unity government with Hamas. This was followed by a series of punitive 
measures against the PA which were convened by Netanyahu and approved by the Israeli 
security cabinet. (Hatuqa 2014) The increasing tension between the Israeli government and 
the Palestinian Authorities may have also served as the backdrop of Israel’s massive 
crackdown on Hamas infrastructure and personnel in the West Bank. In this case, would 
operation Brother’s Keeper be used by Israeli politicians as a tactical ploy for the raids? 
Within the scope of both operations, Israel reportedly resorted to the use of forces and 
violence in the West Bank, in which twenty seven Palestinians were killed (Power and van 
Hoydoonk 2015). Given the complexities and the politics behind it all, any attempt to 
deliver a clean-cut answer for the causes of the war might run into the risk of being 
dogmatic. It is therefore essential to look into it from various angles. While Israel’s 
justification of the war points to self-defense, its actions in Gaza have however been 
criticized as “punitive in nature” and motivated by the reconciliation of the two Palestinian 
factions (Power and van Hoydoonk 2015). 
 
 
1.2 The War, the Media and Public Opinions 
 
During the Israel–Hamas war in 2014, questions on the legality of the Israeli military 
operation in Gaza were central to the debates surrounding it considering the death tolls of 
civilians on both sides. The public however displayed different reactions towards the war. 
Whereas the main sources of criticism levied on operation Protective Edge were coming 
from the international community, in Israel there was a general consensus in favor of the 
military operations in Gaza. During the ongoing development of the war around mid-
August 2014, a poll conducted by the Israeli Democracy Institute (IDI) and Tel Aviv 
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University, with a sample of 600 participants, found that a majority of Israeli Jews (92 
percent) considered operation Protective Edge as justified (IDI 2014). 
 
 
 
Diagram 1: Israeli public opinion on the use of IDF’s firepower in Gaza (The Peace 
Index Poll by the IDI and Tel Aviv University) 
 
When asked about the use of IDF’s firepower in operation Protective Edge thus far, forty-
five percent of Israeli Jews believed that it was appropriate while forty-eight percent 
thought that the IDF resorted to too little firepower in the Strip. More than sixty percent of 
Israeli Arabs however said that the use of firepower was excessive (see Diagram 1). At the 
time of war, facing a public overwhelmingly identifying with the military operations, 
should journalists question their government’s military actions?  
 
A fact further complicating the matter is the indirect involvement of the West who has its 
own shares of vested interests in this conflict. As a result, any news on the disputed land 
would attract a wide range of coverage by the international press. The American press in 
particular, displays a great interest in the conflict and this is also reflective of the American 
public’s attitudes towards the war. (Peterson 2015: 93)  
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Diagram 2: American public opinion on Israel’s military actions against Hamas 
and Palestinians in Gaza (CNN/ORC International Survey)  
 
Within the period from July 18 to July 20, 2014, at the peak of the fighting in Gaza, 
CNN/ORC International carried out a survey through phone interviews and registered votes 
with a sample of 1,911 adult Americans in order to learn about the American public opinion 
towards the war. The poll (see Diagram 2) reveals that more than half (57 percent) of the 
American respondents believed that IDF’s incursion into Gaza in 2014 was just. The results 
are consistent with those of previous Israel’s military operations in the Strip in 2012 and 
2009, operation Pillar of Defense and operation Cast Lead (CNN 2014: 3). More 
importantly, the dominant view among those asked (43 percent) was that the use of forces 
by Israeli militia in Gaza was acceptable. The results of the poll should come as no surprise 
either, considering how Israel has long been the United States’ biggest ally in the Middle 
East. According to the same report, sixty-four percent of the American voters supported the 
continuation of their government’s military aids to Israel (CNN 2014: 3).  
 
While Israelis and Palestinians have their versions of the story, the American press also 
treats the latest news on the conflict distinctively, more or less influenced by their 
government’s political ideology concerning the conflict. CNN for instance, though 
considered “neutral” in the U.S. compared with the right-wing, “partisan agenda” like Fox 
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News (Allan and Zelizer 2004: 6), has been assailed as being both pro-Palestine and pro-
Israel at some point (Barkho 2007; Cox 2014; Ozohu-Suleiman 2014). Though very 
contentious, these critiques of mainstream media undoubtedly reflect the polarization when 
it comes to the Israeli–Palestinian issues.  
 
Given the political and economic interests involved, it is impossible for the media to 
acquire any independence (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014: 69). Mass media inherently depend 
on various external factors to function, including the relationship they maintain with 
conflict actors, their target audience, the editorial guidelines and more. There exists also a 
commercial pressure to bring in the immediate, the breaking news from the battlefield for 
the audience at home and abroad, at the expense of contextualizing the news within the big 
picture. (Puddephatt 2006: 23) The controversy surrounding the media coverage of the 
conflict, the insatiable public demands of honest and unbiased reporting, the constant 
failure of the press in doing so, have altogether made us wonder if we have asked the right 
questions all along. 
 
 
1.3 Research Aims, Questions and Methods  
 
Debates on the media coverage of wars and conflicts often rotate around the lack of 
context, the prioritization of one side of the argument over another, the emphasis on 
militarized actions or the deflation of morality in the warzones. Given the extensive media 
attention to the Israel–Palestine conflict in the past decade, there has been a vast body of 
works studying the coverage of major news networks, from the international news outlets 
such as BBC (Ozohu-Suleiman 2014; Peterson 2015; Shreim and Dawes 2015; Barkho and 
Richardson 2010; Barkho 2008; Philo 2007; Philo 2004), the New York Times (Saariaho 
2015; Fahmy and Eakin 2014), CNN (Ozohu-Suleiman 2014; Kandil 2009; Barkho 2008; 
Barkho 2007), Al Jazeera (Kandil 2009; Barkho 2007; Barkho 2008), the Guardian (Fahmy 
and Eakin 2014) to the Israeli ones such as the Jerusalem Post (Shreim and Dawes 2015) or 
Haaretz (Shreim and Dawes 2015; Fahmy and Eakin 2014).  
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While the mechanism and interplay of textual elements in shaping political ideologies have 
been thoroughly researched (Peterson 2015; Saariaho 2015; Baidoun 2014; Shami 2014; 
Tantish 2012; Kandil 2009; Zaher 2009; Wolf n.d.), there has also been an emerging 
interest in investigating the subjective and objective factors that might one way or another 
influence the quality of the news reports. Empirical studies on these factors are conducted 
by analyzing data containing the internal guidelines, blogs and transcripts of interviews 
with journalists or editors commissioned to cover the war, which give a glimpse into the 
modus operandi of different news networks. The results of these studies have demonstrated 
that there is a direct connection between the discursive practices and the institutional 
policies that govern the process of news production. (Philo 2007; Philo 2004; Barkho, 
2010; Barkho 2008; Dunsky 2008; Barkho 2007) Interestingly, the issues of the relations 
between texts and institutions, between hegemony and knowledge, between discourse and 
power, have been brought up in the field of critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Weiss and 
Wodak 2003), yet there is still a missing gap within media studies stressing this dialectics 
of news production and social practices (Barkho and Richardson 2010).  
 
Discussions stemming from the war/peace journalism angle have also been brought forth, 
though only recently, to question the role of the media in waging warfare (Shreim and 
Dawes 2015; Ozohu-Suleiman 2014; Fahmy and Eakin 2014; Ozohu-Suleiman and Ishak 
2012; Puddephatt 2006). The understanding that the media can actually incite more 
violence has led to the recognition that it can also take a constructive part in reducing 
tension during conflict. The concept of “peace journalism” was thus born out of the 
growing consciousness of the ideological portrayal of wars and conflicts, as a “counter-
strategy” to the uncritical and polarized reportage during wartime. (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 
2014: 86) Notwithstanding the general preference for peace journalism to the traditional 
war journalism, the former has been criticized as too narrowly defined and undermining the 
physical conditions of war reporting (Loyn 2007; Hanitzsch 2007; Nohrstedt and Ottosen 
2014).  
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There is not yet any agreement on what defines good conflict journalism. It leaves room for 
discussions on how to actually locate conflict reportage within the historical and socio-
political context that it entails when there exist such limits on time, space, brevity and 
competition with other outlets for the journalists and their editors to manage. Applying an 
approach which combines peace journalism with critical analysis of news discourse is 
rather novel in the field of study of conflict reportage, but this approach might be efficient 
in understanding how socio-political constraints affect the news discourse, how 
war/violence-oriented journalism is done, thus how to effectively avoid it.  
 
The power of the image should also be reconsidered. The twentieth century marked conflict 
journalism’s turn to the visual. For the majority of spectators who do not have firsthand 
accounts of what goes on in the warzones, the images help to proximate the effects of 
destruction and secure an important role because of their memorability and durability. 
Borrowing the words of Susan Sontag, “the photographs are a means of making “real” (or 
“more real”) matters that the privileged and the merely safe might prefer to ignore” (Sontag 
2003: 7). For journalists, images are often schematized as the illustration, the evidence, in 
other word, the “backseat” of words (Zelizer 2004: 118). One believes the words because 
the image helps to confirm them and one interprets the image by tracing through the words. 
Thus the visual cues have gradually become part and parcel of war reportage not just for 
their explicit and visible content but also for the way they articulate and interact with the 
texts. Videography documentation has also recently been widely incorporated into news 
media, affirming the growing dependence on the visual in today’s conflict journalism.  
 
Photojournalistic representations of the Israel–Palestine conflict have been a subject of 
scholarly studies which aim to understand the role of photographic influence in journalistic 
practices. Unlike words, photographs are often perceived as impartial and factual but under 
certain circumstances, news photographs can also be exploited as an object of 
manipulation, framed to fit in constructed narratives. The findings of previous studies on 
the subject have shown, for example, how the image-format representations of the main 
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actors in the conflict, the Palestinians and the Israelis, can vary according to their depictions 
in different news outlets. (Seo 2014; Woodward 2007; van Leeuwen and Jaworski 2002) 
 
Due to the recent nature of the Gaza war 2014, few research on the media coverage of the 
war has been conducted (Shreim 2015; Malinsky 2015). While earlier works on the subject 
have delved into the assessment of the media bias of the Israel–Palestine conflict, this study 
questions the position of the media in the war and argues that the media play a crucial role 
as a conflict actor. In this sense it is then necessary to figure out whether the media have 
offered any critical assessment of the events in depiction.  
 
The aims of the study are to have an insight into how war reportage is done, how noted 
events during the course of the military operations are framed and how conflict actors, 
including Palestinian civilians and Palestinian armed group Hamas, are represented in the 
news reports. Specifically, the study will look into the way the media cover the outbreak of 
the war and the battle of Shuja’iyya where a high death toll of Palestinian civilians was 
recorded, and which consequently caused heated controversy on military attacks against 
civilian population (Pfeffer 2014b). It examines how the two news networks, Haaretz and 
CNN, one Israeli, one American, report the Israeli incursion into Gaza by discussing the 
differences in their news coverage and by deconstructing the textual and visual semiotics 
that are employed in their articles. The backbone of the study is Galtung’s model of “peace 
journalism” which will be applied as a frame of reference to compare and contrast with the 
conventional, war-oriented form of journalism. The research intends to address the 
following questions: 
 
Q1: How do the outlets cover the onset of the war and the battle of Shuja’iyya? What are 
the differences in their approaches to the news?   
Q2: How do the two news outlets represent major conflict actors, Palestinian civilians and 
Hamas, on the news?  
Q3: From the war/peace journalism perspectives, how can CNN’s and Haaretz’ news 
reports be distinguished from one another?  
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The data used consist of twelve articles that cover news of the war from the launch of IDF’s 
operation Protective Edge in Gaza on July 8 until the final truce on August 26, 2014. All of 
these articles are accessible through the online archives of Haaretz and CNN and they were 
manually selected on the basis of their contents which correspond in terms of the events 
depicted on both news outlets. The articles focus on four specific topics which are: (1) the 
onset of the war, (2) the battle of Shuja’iyya, (3) the official rhetoric of terrorist stronghold 
and (4) the representations of Hamas on the news outlets.  
 
The methodology applied in this study is a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of 
multimodal texts (van Dijk 1985; van Dijk 1988; van Dijk 1995a). The four topics will be 
analyzed using different CDA methodological approaches due to the distinctive contents 
that they cover. In particular, for the first topic, a thematic and schematic structure analysis 
will be used to understand how the conflict unfolds, as well as how the events leading to the 
war are framed and narrated in the news reports. On the other hand, for topics (2), (3) and 
(4), the study will employ a microsemantic structure analysis in order to look into the 
representations the news events and conflict actors on the outlets. Further details of the 
theoretical and methodological framework are delivered in the fifth chapter of this study.   
 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis  
 
This paper begins with a background of the escalation to the Gaza war 2014, followed by a 
general overview of the Israeli and American public reactions towards the war. It then 
proceeds with a discussion of the role of mass media during conflict, with a brief look into 
the media covering the previous Israel–Palestine wars. In the third chapter of the study, 
aspects of ideology, hegemony and discourse will be conferred, with a focus on the 
significance of the binary construction of oppositions. The study continues with an 
introduction to the concepts of “conflict theory” and “peace journalism” as mapped out by 
Johan Galtung. Next, in the sixth chapter of the study, the data collected are analyzed and 
discussed. The paper then concludes with a review of the study.  
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2 MASS MEDIA COVERING CONFLICT 
 
Mass media acquire a crucial position in today’s conflict. The act of compounding facts in 
conflict coverage has become so vital that it can unarguably influence or even control 
public opinions towards the matter. As the images of carnage come flushing in, they 
provoke multitudes of voyeuristic feelings and reactions: fear, then anger, a sense of 
indignation and maybe sympathy, but for whom, against whom? While the media are often 
quick at reporting any violence fueled in the Middle East, they barely offer any peace 
initiatives to solve the problems (Ahlsén 2013: 3). There have been many examples in the 
past pointing out how the media had their hands in heightening tensions in the region, 
which will be examined in this chapter. Although the argument that the press is responsible 
for either building up violence or removing it may border on a rather essentialist view, it 
does highlight an irrefutable fact that the media play an active role during conflict.  
 
 
2.1 The Role of Media in Conflict 
 
Mass media devote much airtime to wars and violence. The motive is simple: warfare, 
terrorism, refugees, ethnic cleansing, border dispute and similar topics, attract readership 
and increase circulation (Gilboa 2006: 605). It certainly suggests the idea that only when 
the process of news production is separated from the making of profits can the media 
acquire any independence. But until then, news production is a process largely confined to 
institutional regulations and external factors beyond the outlet’s practical operations. Since 
the end of the Cold war, research on conflict coverage has paid much attention to studying 
government–media relations based on two “diametrically opposing” frameworks including 
information management and the CNN effect (ibid. 605).  
 
Information management indicates the state’s control and manipulation of mass media at 
the time of war. The media wind up being a strategic instrument for policy makers to 
propagate wars and invasions through the means of news distribution. The origin of the 
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information management approach can be traced back to the American war in Vietnam, 
when it was widely believed that the counter-war mass media contributed to the end of the 
war. Consequently, the lesson for the state is to take hold of the media, restraint and limit 
access to information on the battlefield. (Gilboa 2006: 605) News is then more carefully 
selected, pictures in the warzones framed in a way more favorable to the state’s military 
actions, critiques censored and repressed. These symptoms of a manipulated press can no 
doubt influence the interpretations of news and events. Until the news reaches its targets, it 
may have already been distorted and perverted in a way unknown to its audience.  
 
Conversely, the CNN effect refers to the state’s intervention after the mainstream coverage 
of humanitarian disasters spreads to an extent that forces policy makers to take actions. 
Scholars, journalists and politicians have since used this term to describe phenomena in 
which mainstream media are considered to be the conduit for the Western governments’ 
military interventions abroad, as with the cases of Northern Iraq/Kurdistan, Kosovo, Bosnia 
and Somalia. While the theory generally describes the effects of news media on politics and 
policy-making, it takes roots in the influence that the popular television network CNN has 
posed on the states’ foreign policies in the post-Cold war era. (Gilboa 2006: 605) The idea 
is specifically demonstrated in the case of the first Gulf war 1990–1991. Up until today, the 
controversy surrounding the media coverage of the wars in Iraq has still been frequently 
brought up when it comes to discussions concerning the role of the media in supporting 
their state in waging warfare in foreign lands. The Gulf war is important, not only because 
it marks a confrontation between the West and Iraq, in which a coalition of thirty-four 
nations, the dominant members being the United States, Britain, and France, was against 
the Middle East nation because of its invasion of Kuwait, but also because of the 
questionable reportage that was undoubtedly in favor of the war led by the West. 
(Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014: 17–18) 
 
Numerous studies on the media coverage of the 1991 Gulf war have been conducted (Allen, 
et al. 1994; Eilders 2005), which detail how CNN broadcasts, live from a Baghdad hotel 
(Shaw and Arnett 2003), monopolized the circulation of cross-national news reports on the 
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war in Iraq at the time. Many studies demonstrate a lack of criticism and dimensions on the 
news coverage of the Gulf war which downplays any endeavours against the Bush 
administation in raising warfare in Iraq (Allen, et al. 1994: 257). The uncritical reportage of 
the war, along with the domination of CNN news reports on the global scale, subsequently 
influenced the general public opinion. Public polls during the U.S. military maneuvers in 
Iraq exhibited significant support for the war, at up to eighty percent (ibid. 260). In other 
words, the mainstream media at the time were overtly in compliance with its state. As 
Bernard Shaw, one of the three key CNN reporters during the Gulf war, recounts in an 
interview, journalists entering combat “effectively become hostages of the military” (Shaw 
and Arnett 2003).  
 
The CNN incident has left a deep scar in the ever-changing history of the world media. The 
globalization of news corporates and the advancement in satelite technology have 
nevertheless broken the exclusivity and monopoly of information from Western news 
sources such as CNN (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014: 27). If during the Gulf war, even the 
majority of mainstream Middle East media networks relied heavily on the live broadcasts 
from CNN then today, this is no longer the case. A growing cohort of networks such as 
Reuters, AFP, AP and Anadolu agency has rendered more alternatives for the viewers. The 
rising importance of non-Western news platforms such as Al Jazeera, for instance, has also 
brought about a huge change in the global media landscape. They have no doubt offered 
more alternative voices, especially on issues concerning the Middle East. This extension of 
the media is worth appraising but there have been few significant changes in the journalistic 
practices, especially when news resources are still very much dominated by the twenty-nine 
largest media networks, the majority of which come from the West (Peterson 2015: 47).  
 
The mounting popularity of social network has also affected the position of mass media in 
conflict. The increasing outreach of platforms such as Facebook and Twitter has 
contributed to changes in representations of actors in conflict, by giving them a specific 
medium to communicate with the audience (Shreim 2015; Zeitzof 2016). Social media have 
since proved to be in competition with the traditional line of journalism, especially in terms 
21 	
of information access and a wide diversity of perspectives. Without doubt the expansion of 
social networks only indicates an inclination towards media pluralism, while at the same 
time, putting quality journalism to the test.  
 
There have been many other wars and the role of the media in conflict has continued to be 
under scrutiny from time to time. What few would deny is that if the media have the power 
to promote warfare, they also have the power to mediate an end to the war, first and 
foremost, by staying independently from all sides of the conflict and reporting accurate 
information. It was another war in Iraq in 2003 that once again shows the explicit 
complicitity of certain news outlets in propagating war efforts. The sudden popularity of 
U.S. news houses such as Fox News which sympathized with their state’s decision in 
invading Iraq despite having no UN Security Council resolution this time (Nohrstedt and 
Ottosen 2014: 80), has shown the ugly face of media. Other major news networks such as 
the New York Times also admitted that they should have been more thorough in examining 
the evidence and emerging claims concerning Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of 
mass destruction, thus failed to substantiate the main cause of their government’s war in 
Iraq (Gilboa 2006: 607). In the end, the legality of the U.S. assaults in Iraq was left 
unanswered while the media coverage of the war, especially during the Battles of Fallujah, 
in the words of Noam Chomsky, was a “celebration of ongoing war crimes” (Hamedy 
2010). Within the focus on the Middle East, the Israel–Palestine conflict is singled out due 
to its long-lasting duration and political complications. Likewise the media covering the 
wars in Iraq, the media reporting the conflict have already failed the public many times.  
 
 
2.2 The Media Coverage of the Israel–Palestine Conflict(s)  
 
In this long and grueling conflict, any rundown on the jousting between the opposing forces 
seems to be rather myopic, yet many news reports have rendered their headlines into the tug 
of war, drifting the discussion away from the structural issue. The media covering the 
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Israel–Palestine conflict are extremely divided on the subject inasmuch as periodicals 
accused of being both anti-Israel and a tool of Israeli propaganda are no longer exceptions2. 
 
Among the most intensive works of the media and the Israel–Palestine conflict, Greg Philo 
and Mike Berry’s books (2004; 2011) on the subject reveal a major gap in the overall 
public knowledge on the conflict. Within a span of two years from 2001 to 2002, the pair 
conducted a study (2004) on the audience’s perceptions and understanding of the Israel–
Palestine conflict, in reflection of television news reports of the war. The study (2004) 
demonstrates that a majority of the British public depended on television news as the major 
source of information on the ongoing conflict, as British television provided almost daily 
news reports during the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005. Despite the overwhelming 
reportage, the news reports offered no background information on the historical context and 
the background that premised the war, which led to a confusion in part of the audience even 
as to the point that a large portion of British participants mistook Palestinians as the settlers 
in the occupied territories. Furthermore, most viewers did not acquire any knowledge on 
the Nakba, in which more than 700,000 Palestinians were expulsed from their homeland 
during the 1948 war. Many were unaware of the Western involvements in the conflict, one 
such as the U.S. government’s annual financial support for Israel. This deficiency of 
knowledge certainly affected the public perceptions of the conflict, as many rushed to 
blame Palestinians as the aggressors of the war while being mostly ill-informed of the grave 
physical conditions and the effects of the occupation. The study concludes that there was a 
prejudice in favor of Israeli perspectives on BBC 1 broadcasts, in which Israelis and U.S. 
politicians supporting Israel were interviewed twice as much as Palestinians were. (Philo 
and Berry 2004) 
 
In another book released in 2011, “More bad news from Israel”, Greg Philo and Mike Berry 
one more time examine the details of the media coverage of the 2008–2009 war, also 
known as operation Cast Lead, as well as the Mavi Marmara incident or the Gaza flotilla 
raids in 2010. The results were once again hardly surprising. The lack of knowledge in part 
                                                
2 Take The New York Times, for example (Sullivan 2014). 
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of the participant, an assemble of viewers from the U.S., Britain and Germany, paralleled 
the lack of explanations in part of the news reports. (Philo and Berry 2011) According to 
the authors, BBC’s reportage of the conflict in Gaza at the time was a “carbon copy” of the 
2000 conflict reports (Plunkett 2014).  
 
In response to public criticism, in 2006, an independent panel led by Sir Quentin Thomas 
carried out a report on the impartiality of BBC concerning their reportage of the Israel–
Palestine conflict. This report, however, clears out the allegations against BBC being 
systematically misleading by justifying that BBC made a mistake by not providing the 
complete picture of the situation while still taking a rather neutral stance. (Dowell 2006) 
The conclusion of this report is doubtlessly contrary to the findings of Greg Philo and Mike 
Berry (2004; 2011) which showcase how the de-contextualization of the news can actually 
affect the overall public understanding of the conflict. Another question remains whether 
neutrality can exist in war journalism, for neutrality in the context of exceeding 
disproportion, as in the case of Israel and Palestine, one as the strongest military power in 
the Middle East (Haaretz 2014a) while the other still under occupation, is also a source of 
criticism. The media report who threw the first stone, but hardly explain why the stone was 
thrown (Ahlsén 2013: 9). In this sense, BBC’s coverage can be seen as systematically 
inadequate by focusing on the violence of the war and its collateral damage, while largely 
downplaying the deeper causes behind it and remaining silent about the social and 
psychological problems in the wake of the conflict.  
 
But the BBC is not the lone case when it comes to controversies surrounding the media 
covering the conflict. Many other news outlets have also been under fire for their reportage 
of the conflict. The inflammatory tones of both Israeli and Palestinian media are also an 
underestimated political complication (Puddephatt 2006: 9). Needless to describe the 
attention given to any news on the conflict as the media covering it have become the 
magnets of complaints from readers.  
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The media covering the 2014 Gaza war have already met much protest and disapproval 
from the audience (Plunkett 2014; Zacharia 2014). Readers continue to question the 
fairness of the media, accusing a number of outlets of being “devoid of context”, 
underrepresenting Palestinian voices (Plunkett 2014). Part of the reasons behind these 
accusations is an imbalance in reporting favoring the Israeli perspectives, which is what 
much research on the media coverage of previous wars also points out (Shreim 2015: 8). 
NPR for example, was also obliged to set up a self-assessment of their radio broadcasts of 
the Israel–Palestine conflict during the fourth quarter of 2013 (Schumacher-Matos 2014). 
Note that the review, conducted by NPR’s former foreign editor John Felton, similarly 
finds the network’s broadcasts of remarkable accuracy and without any systematic bias but 
there is an evident discrepancy in terms of narratives (Felton 2014: 9). According to the 
report, listeners of NPR’s radio broadcasts generally hear more often from Israelis and 
Israeli officials than they do from Palestinians (ibid. 9). In explaining for such imbalance, a 
NPR’s journalist writes:  
Israel generates more news in part because its officials are more open and the 
country is more democratic than in the Palestinian territories. Israel stages more 
newsworthy “official” events, such as elections, and its economy is far more 
dynamic. Israel also is an ally of the U.S., and its officials frequently visit. The Gaza 
Strip in particular is miniscule. NPR’s sole correspondent is based in Jerusalem. 
(Schumacher-Matos 2014)  
This explanation, if anything, only confirms the accusation of the news network as being 
one-sided and unmistakably implies their political stance of the conflict. It also highlights a 
preference of official narratives over ordinary voices and a systematic structure of selected 
reporting based on exposure of information and preconceived notions. As the report reads, 
“voices convey authority and emotion as well as information” (Felton 2014: 9), hence, 
Israeli perspectives are given more weights and credibility simply because listeners get to 
hear more from the Israeli voices. Though problematic, the NPR example presents a 
commonly accepted reality of Mideast reports, suggesting geopolitics of information 
existing in the media landscape of this conflict.  
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3 HEGEMONY AND DISCOURSE 
 
In the words of Roland Barthes, “language is never innocent” (1953: 16). Words produce 
various versions of realities, words shape our understanding of the world, words help to 
construct it. In an era in which the majority of people count on the Internet and television as 
their main sources of information, mass-mediatized representations of wars and conflicts 
can have a profound effect on our knowledge on the matter. But how do representations 
contribute to the receptions of news? How does the press construct the images of conflict 
actors based on their representational differences? What is the role of difference in 
structuring political discourses? What are the power relations between those represented 
and the institutions doing the representing? Are these representational constructions a 
deliberate attempt of a hegemonic articulation? In this chapter, we set out to answer these 
questions, by discussing the meanings of “difference” and “stereotype” based on Stuart 
Hall’s cultural theories of ideology, by examining the connection between hegemony and 
language according to Gramsci and by showing the importance of looking at how 
representations are constructed in journalistic practices.  
 
 
3.1 The Binary Construction of Differences  
 
There exists a connection between “difference” and “power”, which efficiently serves the 
politics of representation (Hall 1997: 229). Subjects perceived as significantly different 
from the majority, Us, are often exposed to binary forms of representation, in the opposing 
extremes of good/bad, civilized/savage, primitive/modern, forward/backward and the likes 
(ibid. 229). The markings of difference and otherness are compelling to the discursive and 
representational practices surrounding the discourse of wars and conflict. There are four 
theoretical disciplines that help to explain the question of difference and its importance, as 
mapped out by Stuart Hall (1997).  
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First, in terms of linguistics, difference matters because it is indispensable for forming 
meaning, that without difference, meaning could not exist (Hall 1997: 234). The idea is 
rooted in de Saussure’s structuralist view of semantics, that “language is a system of 
interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous 
presence of the others” (de Saussure 1966: 114). Citing de Saussure, “in language there are 
only differences” (ibid. 120), words acquire meaning in difference and in relations with 
other words and meaning gains value within the semiological system. These values are 
negative and inherently differential. We know the meaning of “black” when it is put next to 
the word “white”. It is this oppositional difference between “black” and “white” that creates 
the signification of the word (Hall 1977: 234). Drawing on de Saussure’s principles of 
semiological differences, Derrida proposes what he terms as différance, a concept that 
looks upon difference as a distinction, an inequality, “an interposition of delay” of meaning. 
For Derrida, the binary or elemental oppositions are not just a theoretical but also practical 
operation that defines texts in reciprocal determination with other texts, and there are very 
few neutral forms of these elemental oppositions. (Derrida 1973: 129) Although binary 
poles of opposition are necessary in constructing meaning, they are dangerous, especially 
when there exist relations of power between the binary oppositions in which one pole is 
more dominant.  
 
Second, difference is important in the construction of meaning through a dialogue with the 
Other. It derives from the concepts of dialogic and dialogism by Russian philosopher and 
linguist Mikhail Bakhtin. (Hall 1997: 235) The processes of dialogues are central to the 
studies of Bakhtin, who believes that languages do not exist in a vacuum but rather they 
intersect. Bakhtin argues that the dialogic property of discourse exists in all languages, that 
“everything means, is understood, as a part of a greater whole – there is a constant 
interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning others”. 
(Bakhtin 1981: 426) Meaning is negotiated through the difference in dialogues, which 
explains why the presence of the Other is fundamental to the development of meaning (Hall 
1997: 236). For Bakhtin, meaning is hybrid, it is not fixed, with differing nuances and 
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stratifications under a centrifugal force but the core content remains unchanged (Bakhtin 
1981: 270).  
 
Third, anthropologically, difference is considered to be the basis of a cultural order, that is 
to say, things are assigned meanings within a classificatory system. Lévi-Strauss argues that 
classifying is “a step towards rational ordering” (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 10), that human beings 
always feel the need to classify to order different objects within a coherent framework. In 
this sense, difference is needed in putting things in an order and the construction of binary 
oppositions is thus crucial to the classificatory system. Problems however can arise when 
the order of things is disturbed, when established assumptions are challenged, when some 
facts refuse to fit in any categories (Douglas 1966: 38). As this system of selecting and 
organizing objects in an order is largely subjective and at the same time, social, we slowly 
develop a conservative bias that requires things to remain the same, to be placed in their 
assigned positions. The theory also spells out an uncomfortable truth that cultures retain 
their originality, their purity and identity by retreating from anything alien and foreign that 
threatens to cross the symbolic boundaries and break the unwritten social norms (Hall 
1997: 237). In the words of Stuart Hall, “marking difference leads us, symbolically, to close 
ranks, shore up culture and to stigmatize and expel anything which is defined as impure, 
abnormal” (ibid. 237). But paradoxically, it also makes difference appealing, precisely 
because it implies something taboo and forbidden to the established order (ibid. 237), hence 
the fascination with otherness, with anything exotic, different.  
 
Fourth, the importance of difference is recognized in terms of psychoanalysis. Hall employs 
the Freudian theory of the Oedipus Complex to illustrate the idea that the presence of the 
Other is constitutive to the construction of the Self. This construction has both negative and 
positive implications. He argues that the Self is never “fully unified” and that it depends on 
the unconscious relations with the Other to complete itself. (Hall 1997: 238) At the same 
time, this process might never be fulfilled and although the Other is necessary to complete 
the Self, it is external, an outside subject, which indicates that it is something that the Self is 
always lacking. The psychoanalytic accounts of the Self and the Other have since 
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influenced various theories, including the binary construction of the Self and the Enemy 
which frequently comes up in the discourse of wars and conflicts (Carpentier 2011).  
 
Overall, these four theoretical disciplines, the linguistic, the social, the cultural and the 
psychic levels, help to explain the importance of difference in different respects. For Hall, 
difference is “ambivalent”, in the sense that it can be both positive and negative. It is 
fundamental for the production of meaning, for social and cultural formations and 
classifications, for the construction of identity, but at the same time, it alludes to something 
menacing while building up fear and hostility of the Self towards the Other. (Hall 1997: 
238) The danger of difference is when it is naturalized, finalized, fixed. Hall uses the 
difference between black people and white people to exemplify the process of 
naturalization. If the difference between them is considered cultural, it means that it is open 
to change and modifications, but if it is looked upon as natural, then it is perceived as being 
innate, permanent and unchanged. Naturalization is a representational strategy that secures 
discursive and ideological “closure”. It is however a dangerous approach, because it builds 
up racist stereotypes, in this case, of black people, reducing them to their “essence”. (ibid. 
245) The current discourse on Islam and terrorism goes likewise, as the two concepts are 
often paired up on mass media, it gradually accumulates to the Islamophobic notion that 
there is a connection between them, that terrorism is rooted in the religion, ergo, any 
Muslim is a potential terrorist (nature). “Stereotyping” is thus seen as a practice that 
“essentializes, naturalizes, and fixes difference” (Hall 1997: 258). It reduces the subjects in 
depiction to few essential characteristics which are considered inherent and fixed by nature. 
It is one of the main approaches to the construction of the Other, typically and widely 
instrumentalized by mainstream media.  
 
Stereotype distinguishes itself from “type” which on the other hand, refers to simple and 
widely accepted traits or most likely fixed characterization with little development over 
time (Dyer 2001: 355). Defining type is needed, however, in order to understand what 
stereotype is. In his essay on “Stereotyping”, Dyer states that, “types are instances which 
indicate those who live by the rules of society (social types) and those whom the rules are 
29 	
designed to exclude (stereotypes)” (ibid. 355). In this sense, it is understood that 
stereotyping embodies in itself the idea of excluding, ostracizing anything repelling or 
abnormal to what is commonly accepted, or what one familiarizes with. Philosopher and 
literary critic Julia Kristeva calls this process of casting off, of excluding, an “abjection” 
(Hall 1997: 258). For this reason, stereotyping also reflects an inequality in power between 
the subject represented and those representing it. It is this discursive form of power that 
binds Us together into an “imagined community” against Them who are different, deviant, 
unknown (ibid. 258). More importantly, it reflects a hierarchy grounded in the 
establishment of a normalcy which is nevertheless the product of the ruling groups who 
have the power to curb the society according to their world views, value-system, and 
political ideology (Dyer 2001: 356). Interestingly, this is consistent with what Gramsci 
defines as a social hegemony. 
 
 
3.2 Ideology, Hegemony and Discourse 
 
The question of how ideology is (re)produced and perpetuated to maintain social 
inequalities has been thoroughly addressed by Marxist intellectuals (Barkho and 
Richardson 2010: 2). Though built on Marxist theories, the Gramscian model of ideology 
derives significantly from that of his predecessors while still retaining the conception of 
social classes, the capitalist mode of production and the distinction between the economic 
base and the cultural domain of the superstructure. The highlight of this theoretical 
development is the idea of an ideological struggle for hegemony between classes, which is 
created throughout the cultural realm of society. For Gramsci, social hegemony is not a 
matter of “coercion” or “consent”, but rather it is the ingenuous combination of the two. 
(Stoddart 2007: 202) Hegemony is a form of power, a political type of relation (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985: 139) in which the dominant or ruling class successfully fashions the society 
according to their interests and world views in a way that gains consent from subordinate 
groups and is accepted as common sense.  
 
30 	
One of the main issues for the ruling class is to maintain the relative power of the 
bureaucracy within the society, which demands a general consensus from the masses. This 
indicates a necessity to produce “a condition of moral and political passivity” that subdues 
the collective consciousness. (Gramsci 1971: 333) As a result, the crisis of hegemony is the 
failure to secure consent from the masses, prompting the state of political passivity to 
transform into activity (ibid. 210). The struggle for hegemony between classes is a constant 
process, in which a certain degree of equilibrium is compromised. Hegemony is, to that 
end, the result of a strenuous contestation between the ruling class and other social groups 
(Stoddart 2007: 201). There is never a single dominant ideology. The conception of 
ideology is replaced by a dominant discourse which implicitly manifests itself throughout 
all aspects of the public spheres (ibid. 328). In the words of Gramsci,  
The ‘normal’ exercise of hegemony […] is always made to ensure that force will 
appear to be based on the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs 
of public opinion, newspapers and associations which therefore, in certain 
situations, are artificially multiplied. (Gramsci 1971: 80)  
 
The ruling class gains support and consent from other groups in three principal ways: by 
taking into consideration the interests of groups that it exercises hegemony over, by 
promulgating the consent or the concessions that it has achieved and by maintaining 
hegemony via education. Gramsci believes that the school, the church, newspapers, 
magazines and book trades are the biggest cultural institutions responsible for 
disseminating hegemonic power, for “keeping the ideological world in movement” in a 
country. (Gramsci 1971: 342) 
 
Integrating Gramsci’s theory of hegemony into post-structuralism, Chantal Mouffe and 
Ernesto Laclau develop the interdisciplinary theoretical framework of “Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy” which has been applied in various fields of research including 
journalism and media studies. One departure of the theory is the emphasis that all social 
subjects and phenomena acquire meaning through discourse and that hegemony emerges 
through articulatory practices that enable it to be passed on to the public. This is how 
political identities are constructed in the general field of discursivity which takes place in a 
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confrontation with antagonistic articulation. Thus the conditions for a hegemonic discourse 
are the antagonistic forces and the frontier within a dichotomized political space. (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985: 134–136) 
 
Laclau and Mouffe reject Gramsci’s essentialist idea that hegemonic identities are founded 
on the notion of fundamental classes and that every social structure revolves around a 
hegemonic center. For them, hegemonic ideas only become widely dispersed in modern 
times when articulatory practices have already been immensely broadened. As a result, 
every social identity is constituted in “a multiplicity of articulatory practices”, many of 
which are antagonistic. This is not to say that the identities of those represented/the 
articulated and those representing/the articulator are unchanged and permanent, but rather, 
they are fluid, with both subjected to a continual process of subversion and redefinition. 
Another interesting point in Laclau and Mouffe’s studies of hegemony is that there exists a 
relationship between hegemony, political subjectivity and discourse. Social inequalities are 
reproduced when hegemonic discourses are incorporated into individual subjectivities. 
There is always a need for a society to form its own intelligibility through a dividing 
mechanism, that is, by disregarding any “surplus of meaning” that subverts its own 
rationality. (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 136–139) Common sense, after all, is the result of a 
political articulation, a struggle for hegemony.  
 
With this expansion on Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, the connection between discourse 
and power is further affirmed. At the same time, this connection implicates the exercise of 
power through representational practices (Hall 1997: 259). Edward Said’s discussion on 
Orientalism, for instance, pinpoints to a Western hegemony over the Orient politically, 
culturally, socially, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and even imaginatively. Said 
states that through tropes of representation, that is to say, means not just limited to 
literature, but also extended to art, architecture, education and the likes, discourse can build 
up an ideological, racialized image of the Other, embedded in the power relations between 
Us/the West and Them/the Orient. (Hall 1997: 259–260) Connecting Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony with Foucault’s theorization of power-knowledge, Said emphasizes that power is 
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not exercised exclusively through force and coercion but it also wins consent, approval, 
concessions, compromise, by projecting itself onto the realm of knowledge, culture, arts, all 
that belong to private and public domains. “It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural 
hegemony at work”, argues Said, “that gives Orientalism the durability and the strength”, 
that produces a hegemonic discourse of a “European superiority over Oriental 
backwardness”, an idea so deeply ingrained that it can override any skeptical, independent 
views on the matter. (Said 1979: 7) Power, to that extent, not only prevents, controls, 
restraints knowledge but also establishes and reproduces new knowledge that is gradually 
taken for granted as the common sense.  
 
On that premise, Said examines the active role of the media, as part of the cultural field of 
production, in producing and maintaining ideological and hegemonic discourses. By 
bringing forth examples of the mediatized representations of Muslims and Arabs, and later 
more specifically of Palestinians, he questions the objectivity of Western mainstream media 
in terms of the power-knowledge analysis. Squarely referencing to the Israel–Palestine 
conflict, Said believes that the construction of representation of Israel on the American 
news as “our staunch ally”, “the only democracy” in the Middle East, has been used as “the 
foil” for the Islamic world, perpetuating the Western hegemony with its defined virtues of 
modernization. According to Edward Said, “Israel has appeared as a bastion of Western 
civilization hewn out of the Islamic wilderness”. Thus for Said, this kind of one-sided 
reporting leaning towards Israel manifests the Western interests in shoring up their self-
image and power over the Orient in three ways: the view of Islam, the ideology of 
civilization, and the attestation of Israel’s values to the West. (Said 2000: 194) No doubt 
the content of these discussions is indispensable for the subject of this research paper.  
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4 WAR JOURNALISM AND PEACE JOURNALISM 
 
Conflict can be considered as being one of the defining features of modern-day societies 
(Puddephatt 2006: 5). Many wars broke out due to conflicts of interests as violence is the 
extreme form of aggression. For journalists covering conflict, it is important to first and 
foremost identify the many structural layers of conflict: how the conflict unfolds, the 
sources of conflict, the elements of conflict, or possible resolutions to conflict, all of these 
aspects can be referred to as the “conflict dynamics” (Lynch 2007: 8). Johan Galtung is the 
pioneer of Peace and Conflict studies, a transdisciplinary field that seeks to examine the 
origins and the nature of conflict, offering conflict resolutions and transformation in order 
to prevent and control violence. Conflict theories lay the ground for the peace journalism 
model later developed by Galtung (1996). 
 
 
4.1 Conflict Theory, Conflict Formation and Conflict Transformation 
 
According to Johan Galtung, a conflict takes place when it involves “actors in pursuit of 
incompatible goals” (Galtung 2009: 24). Conflict exists in interactions and relationships 
between individuals, among groups and manifests itself through actions or attitudinal and 
behavioral patterns that can be dormant, accumulated and built into systems or institutional 
levels of governments, corporations, or civil societies (Miller 2005: 22).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The ABC conflict triangle (Galtung 1996: 72) 
 
Attitude: Empathy (hatred, distrust, 
apathy) 
Behavior: Nonviolence (physical and 
verbal violence) 
Contradiction: Creativity (blocked, 
stymied) (A)ttitude 
(B)ehavior 
(C)ontradiction 
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Galtung’s ABC conflict triangle (see Figure 3) can be used as a conceptual framework in 
order to define conflict. There is reciprocation among A–Attitude, B–Behavior, C–
Contradiction, which exhibits on either a manifest or latent level. Contradiction may be 
experienced when a goal cannot be reached, which then leads to an attitudinal and 
behavioral escalation: a frustration. Frustration can turn inwards and intensify into attitudes 
or acts of aggression which may not be compatible with those of other group(s) or 
individual(s) concerned, resulting in a contradiction/conflict between them. Violence 
breeds violence, hatred produces more hatred, all make it a vicious cycle that only ends at 
the point of destruction. (Galtung 1996: 72–73) A minority marginalized by a government 
or elite groups, deprived of needs and rights that need to be fulfilled, may accumulate 
frustration and resentment against the ruling parties, the consequences of which are 
heightened tensions between groups, conceiving conditions for potential physical 
confrontation.  
 
The root of conflict is in the incompatibility between parties of conflict when competing for 
goals. This goal-seeking system is referred to by Galtung as “conflict formation”. Conflict 
formation is a complex process, with many parties, many goals and many issues involved. 
The elementary conflict formation with two parties and one goal is rare, but this commonly 
known concept of conflict, as often mistakenly depicted on mainstream media, is usually 
simplified and polarized for economic and political sake. (Galtung 1996: 79)  
 
According to Galtung, there are four levels of conflict: (1) the micro level (intra and 
interpersonal conflict); (2) the meso level (intergroup but intra-society conflict); (3) the 
macro level (interstate, inter-nation); and (4) the mega level (inter-region, inter-civilization) 
(Galtung 2003: 7). In the field of international relations, conflict is generally identified as 
either interstate, internal or state-formation conflicts. While interstate conflicts are about 
disputes among nation-states, internal and state-formation conflicts include civil and ethnic 
wars, secessionist or autonomous movements, territorial disputes, or anti-colonialist 
movements, to name a few. (Miller 2005: 22) The concept of “global conflicts”, though a 
fairly new phenomenon, has been widely used to describe groups that can inflict influence 
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and violence on both international and regional levels (ibid. 22). In terms of current global 
conflicts, the conflict parties can be “territorial actors” (countries and other territories), 
“non-territorial actors” (organization, associations, corporations), “human groups” (national 
or transnational), humans in general and nature (Galtung 2009: 126).  
 
The life-cycle of a conflict is divided into three main phases: outbreak of violence, the 
phase of violence and cessation of violence, with truce or ceasefire taking place in the 
interim (Galtung 2009). Although cessation of violence is often accompanied by a peace 
agreement between conflict parties, which supposedly indicates the end of the war and the 
fact that civilians are not under any imminent threat or dangers, this has not always been 
the case. The Israel–Palestine conflict is the clearest demonstration, in which there have 
been numerous ceasefires and peace agreements brokered by foreign states but there is still 
no sign of peace and civilians are frequently under threat. The concept of conflict however, 
should not be confused with violence in any case, as conflict is part of human nature, a 
“complex human phenomenon” (Galtung 2003: 5). Violence should not be seen as a 
fundamental and unavoidable means of conflict because conflict can also be a peaceful 
process that aims to sustain peace through peaceful resolutions and initiatives. In this sense, 
violence is preventable when the conflict is transformed.  
 
A conflict involves all A, B, and C (see Figure 3), so the resolution to the conflict, 
according to Galtung, is the de-escalation of all of these aspects (Galtung 2009: 105). It is 
crucial to approach all A, B and C in order to tackle the central incompatibilities of parties 
concerned. A conflict solution is only efficient when it is “acceptable” and “sustainable” for 
all those involved (Galtung 1996: 87). Conflict transformation is not a temporary but a 
perpetual, continuing process. Ceasefire, for instance, is not a peace solution and it does not 
signify the end of the war. Peace negotiations, in this understanding, demand a resolute end 
to fighting and aim to solve all the contradictions existing among the opposing parties. 
Conflict transformation follows a general formula that requires first, to identify the goals of 
the parties and second, to distinguish whether these goals are legitimate or not. The next 
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step is to build peace, to reduce violence, to reconcile the parties and to depolarize existing 
social and political structures. (Galtung 2003: 9) 
 
Each conflict is unique and the sources of conflict can draw on various reasons, from a 
contest for natural resources, a structural imbalance of power, disputes over territorial 
boundaries, to religious and ethnic tensions. In the end, the basis of any political 
discussions on conflict is simply about the basic human needs. (Galtung 2009: 116) Basic 
needs correspond to a number of socio-political aspects and remain recurrent problems in 
contemporary societies. In order to provide a complete picture of the conflict, journalists 
should provide information on the background and socio-economic context that govern the 
political sphere of the conflict as well as the attitudinal and behavioral changes of all parties 
concerned (du Toit 2014: 9). Too often however, these issues are not thoroughly addressed 
in conflict reportage.  
 
 
4.2 What is Peace Journalism? 
 
Peace journalism is a concept first coined by Johan Galtung, which later evolved into a 
philosophical framework and entered discourses on journalism during the 1970s. This 
journalistic concept draws on studies of conflict theories that examine the root and actors of 
conflict formation in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the conflict dynamics 
for better conflict transformation (Galtung 1996). According to Galtung, peace journalism 
distinguishes itself from traditional war journalism by depolarizing the process of reporting 
war, looking into the perspectives of all those involved and not just that of “our side”, de-
escalating tension by emphasizing peace via peaceful means and mapping the conflict 
within structural, cultural and historical contexts (Galtung 2002: 262). Peace journalism is 
proposed as the alternative to the uncritical, perfunctory, one-dimensional reportage of the 
war (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014: 81). 
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Conventional media, which Galtung labels as “war journalism”, concentrate on the visible 
effects of the war such as physical demolitions, casualties, death tolls, and the like, but they 
are likely to be negligent of the invisible aspects such as socio-cultural damages, 
psychological impact or post-conflict traumatic experiences that can affect generations to 
come. Conflict, in war journalism, requires winners and losers, which is nonetheless sports-
archetypical. Ceasefire is not a temporal option but a solution, for “winning is not the only 
thing, but everything”. When covering conflict, journalists often face two directions. On the 
low road, the focus is placed on the battleground: How many are wounded and how many 
killed? Who holds the reins and wins the war? In his words, the battle zones turn to be a 
“sports arena and gladiator circus” where violence is regularly confused as conflict, and 
journalists report violence when they mean conflict. On the high road, the focus is however 
on the process of transformation, giving voices to all, as opposed to the zero-sum analysis, 
prioritizing truths over propagandas and cover-ups, even when it means to write against 
one’s own administration. (Galtung 2002: 259–260) 
 
Galtung also argues that peace journalism is a “journalism of attachment”, in the sense that 
terror and injustice should not be reported with neutrality, indifference. This nonetheless 
can be accomplished with responsible, professional reporting. War journalism that 
celebrates animosity among nation-states should be considered as a relic of the past. 
Conventional mainstream media values more often than not go in the opposite direction. 
News is newsworthy when it is about elite people in elite countries and when it is negative 
and personalized because as the reasoning goes, it sells. On the other hand, stories dealing 
with transformation, structural changes, with focus on non-elite people from non-elite 
countries, are not considered crowd-pullers. (Galtung 2002: 262) Still sports journalism of 
wars and conflicts has, for decades, predominated Western journalistic practices that are 
often taken to be objective (Keeble, Tulloch and Zollman 2010: 262). 
 
Information leaving the war zones never stays in the same form when it reaches the 
audience but often has to go through a process of being selected, edited, filtered. Peace 
journalists are information brokers and their job is not only about informing the audience, 
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but also going between exposing and critically inspecting the information (Keeble, Tulloch 
and Zollman 2010: 262). To report is to select the news, according to Jake Lynch, and the 
basic idea of peace journalism is when editors and reporters, all those involved in the 
process of news production, make conscious choices on what and how to report, suggesting 
creativity and opportunities for the society to opt for non-violent resolutions (Lynch 2007: 
1). Peace journalism challenges the prevailing norms of mainstream media, targeting 
journalists and editors covering wars and conflicts from an ethical perspective.  
 
Peace correspondents are obliged to face a range of questions governing their works: What 
are the roots of the conflict in terms of structure, culture and history? Who are the parties 
and what are their real goals? What are the visible and invisible effects once violence gets 
in the way? Who is working to prevent violence and promote reconciliation? (Galtung 
2002: 260). As for readers, peace journalism encourages them to look for alternative media 
that opt for constructive and comprehensive insight into the conflict while at the same time, 
still allowing them to form their own opinions (Ahlsén 2013: 6). In the end, communication 
is the key and the media, both local and international, play a central role in offering 
possible conflict resolutions by enabling dialogues between opposing groups in the conflict.  
 
Galtung’s model of peace journalism is based on a series of comparisons and contrasts with 
traditional war journalism, which, according to his opinion, feeds on violence, propaganda, 
victory and a partiality for “our side”, as opposed to peace journalism that is considered to 
be more people-oriented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 	
Table 1. Peace/conflict journalism versus war/violence journalism (Galtung 2002: 261) 
Peace/conflict journalism War/violence journalism 
1. Peace/conflict-orientated  
§ Explore conflict formation, x parties, y 
goals, z issues general “win, win” 
orientation  
§ open space, open time; causes and 
outcomes anywhere, also in 
history/culture  
§ making conflicts transparent  
§ giving voice to all parties; empathy, 
understanding  
§ see conflict/war as problem, focus on 
conflict creativity  
§ humanization of all sides; more so the 
worse the weapons  
§ proactive: prevention before any 
violence/war occurs  
§ focus on invisible effects of violence 
(trauma and glory, damage to 
structure/culture) 
1. War/violence-orientated  
§ Focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal 
(win), war general zero-sum orientation  
§ closed space, closed time; causes and 
exits in arena, who threw the first stone  
§ making wars opaque/secret  
§ “us-them” journalism, propaganda, 
voice, for “us”  
§ see “them” as the problem, focus on who 
prevails in war  
§ dehumanization of “them”; more so the 
worse the weapon  
§ reactive: waiting for violence before 
reporting  
§ focus only on visible effect of violence 
(killed, wounded and material damage) 
 
2. Truth-orientated  
§ Expose untruths on all sides  
§ uncover all cover-ups 
2. Propaganda-orientated  
§ Expose “their” untruths  
§ help “our” cover-ups/lies 
3. People-orientated  
§ Focus on suffering all over; on women, 
aged children, giving voice to voiceless  
§ give name to all evil-doers 
§ focus on people peace-makers 
 
3. Elite-orientated  
§ Focus on “our” suffering; on able-bodied 
elite males, being their mouth-piece  
§ give name to their evil-doers  
§ focus on elite peace-makers 
 
4. Solution-orientated  
§ Peace = non-violence + creativity  
§ highlight peace initiatives, also to 
prevent more war focus on structure, 
culture, the peaceful society Aftermath: 
resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation 
 
4. Victory-orientated 
§ Peace = victory + ceasefire  
§ conceal peace-initiative, before victory 
is at hand 
§ focus on treaty, institution, the 
controlled society 
§ leaving for another war, return if the old 
flares up again 
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Based on Galtung’s model, various studies have looked into war/violence journalism in 
terms of representations of parties involved (Cammaert and Carpentier 2009; Carpentier 
2011; Boulton 2013). The duel between opposing forces, which war journalism often 
mistakenly reduces to two, is often highlighted and over-reported. When constructing 
images of conflict actors, war journalism often rotates around the dichotomies of good/evil, 
justified/unjustified, innocent/guilty, rational/irrational, civilized/barbaric, civilian/militant. 
When entering war, each side seeks to rationalize their actions by building the image of the 
Enemy, structuring their discourses around the political identities of Us and Them, making 
sure that the voice of the Enemy is stifled, repressed, silenced. This is strengthened by a 
range of juxtaposition before, during, and after the conflict, the effects of which turn out to 
be inflammatory. (Carpentier 2011: 4–5)  
 
When mass-mediatized, these political representations can trigger different attitudes and 
emotions from spectators who will likely look upon Them as a subject that creates fear and 
violence. The danger of this approach is that it can potentially build up misleading 
stereotypes of conflict actors. Examples of the media coverage during the War on terror, the 
circulation of the Abu Ghraib torture images, to name a few, have demonstrated how 
dichotomy was strategically propagated by the media to vindicate violence (Cammaert and 
Carpentier 2009: 7). Mainstream media coverage of wars and conflicts tends to be 
hegemonic in two respects: first, in their building images of the Self and the Enemy and 
second, in the process of news production that already in itself connotes hierarchy: What is 
newsworthy? What conflict should be prioritized? The media’s tendency to exclude voices 
of non-elite sources in interviews, in reports, only makes this genealogical approach a 
“sanitized narration of the war”. (Cammaert and Carpentier 2009: 5) 
 
 
4.3 Critiques of Peace Journalism  
 
Peace journalism, nevertheless, has received much criticism not only from academics but 
also from journalists themselves. Some of the main arguments against the concept point to 
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its oversimplification of battlefield complexities, as well as its inevitable breach of 
journalistic objectivity, much foreign to the professionalism that it claims.  
 
One of the main opponents of peace journalism is David Loyn, who has been a BBC 
correspondent for more than three decades and who claims that peace journalism is the 
opposite of good journalism. Loyn criticizes that peace journalists, by deliberately 
positioning themselves as participants within the conflict, run the risk of transgressing into 
peace advocators and that the job of the conflict journalists is observing and reporting, not 
peacemaking. Loyn argues against the “journalism of attachment”, saying that journalistic 
objectivity requires journalists to report what they see and not to close their eyes to what in 
their opinions does not fit. (Loyn 2007) In a commentary discussing the ethics of reporting 
the 2014 Gaza war, Loyn expresses a strong objection against the idea of setting sentiments 
in journalism, as for him, “emotion is the stuff of propaganda, and news is against 
propaganda” (Loyn 2014).  
 
In the same vein, Hanitzsch criticizes peace journalism for its overestimation of journalists’ 
influence on political decisions and more importantly, its “overly individualistic and 
voluntaristic perspective” that tends to undermine the structural constraints that conflict 
journalists face, such as personnel, time, material resources, editorial procedures and 
hierarchies, textual constraints, field access, sources of information and the likes. Hanitzsch 
classifies peace journalism into two major concepts, “interventionist reporting” which 
actively promotes peace through the means of public advocation, and the classic “good 
journalism” which rejects antagonism and hegemony or the dichotomy of “the good” and 
“the evil”. He recognizes that news reports are based on “cognition and contingent 
(re)construction of reality”, thus these subjective reconstructions can be made objective as 
long as they are coherent with other supposed “facts”. The loophole in peace journalism is 
the lack of a clear-cut epistemological foundation, the seemingly unchallenged nature to the 
sense of detachment, objectivity and neutrality which, in his opinion, are the conventional 
values that define professional journalism. Furthermore, the practice of peace journalism 
might encounter various difficulties when applied to a range of conflict constellations, as it 
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underestimates the fact that individualistic values cannot overtake corporate values, 
especially during this era of globalized media corporates. (Hanitzsch 2007: 5)  
 
Nevertheless, various studies on peace journalism have shown that it has developed into 
complex media strategies that aim to raise critical awareness and improve representations 
of conflict actors (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005; Shinar 2009; Fahmy and Eakin 2014). 
News production depends on a systematic process of information selection, which gives 
gatekeepers the power to decide which news items can be admitted through the gate and 
which should be kept out (Lynch 2007: 2). Story framing defines and characterizes the 
practices of making news and what we should be questioning is not just how far and 
accurate the information is but also what the media want us to know. The fact remains that 
the media have been previously employed by interest groups as a means of propaganda to 
promote their political doctrines, so when it comes to analysis and discussion of conflict 
reportage, it is an omission failing to mention propaganda (Lynch 2007: 2).  
 
Reporting the activities of combatants and the brutality of the war is simply not enough, as 
the job of journalists is also about organizing and contextualizing the information within 
the “conflict dynamics”: the root of the conflict and its diversion, the causes and effects, the 
conflict actors and their great interests, voices from the experts, voices from the ordinary 
(Lynch 2007: 8). Peace journalism has more ambitious intentions. By encompassing all 
sides of the war, it strives to get them all at a roundtable, rather than dichotomizing the 
parties into victims and aggressors. In whichever way it is to be read and interpreted, the 
basic idea of peace journalism is to provide the audience accurate news from the conflict 
within hindsight. Reliable information remains the priority of conflict reportage, and by 
reporting different views of actors within the conflict, the media already help to break down 
misconceptions and stereotypes of conflict actors (Puddephatt 2006: 25).  
 
In response to the criticism that conflict reporting should divorce from expressions of 
emotion in order to retain objectivity, it is necessary to emphasize that there is a distinction 
between objectivity and neutrality. Many journalists argue that it is fairly possible to be 
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objective by simply reporting facts, but it does not mean that they have to be neutral in the 
face of carnage and horror (Gilboa 2006: 597). In the words of Ed Vulliamy, the Guardian's 
war correspondent during the Bosnian war, “by remaining neutral, we reward the bullies of 
history […]. We create a mere intermission before the next round of atrocities” (Vulliamy 
1999: 603). Vulliamy and many other conflict reporters opt for the journalism of 
attachment, which impels journalists to work more with people: those who incite the war, 
those who fight for it and those who suffer from it (Gilboa 2006: 597). Practicing the 
journalism of attachment does not necessarily separate journalists from their professional 
integrity but only demonstrates that in reporting news, journalists also represent their views 
and interests.  
 
In any case, given the politicization and complexities of the media infrastructure, neutrality 
in conflict reporting seems like a myth. When it is generally agreed that the media are also 
part of the conflict and have in fact, shaped our overall understanding of contemporary 
conflicts, it should then be reflected that with proper attention and support, they can also 
create and build up the “conditions for peace” (Puddephatt 2006: 5).  
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5 DATA & METHODOLOGY    
 
While the connection between text and institution, or the “mediation between the social and 
the linguistic” in the words of Weiss and Wodak, has been previously a subject of study in 
the field of critical discourse analysis, there is still a lack of a theoretical framework that 
reconciles the sociological and linguistic properties of news discourse (Weiss and Wodak 
2003: 7). For much research on the subject, the question would be what conceptual tool can 
be applied, as the practical intentions to analyze the dialectics between text and institution 
are to assess media accountability and to reappraise the institutional polices that govern the 
process of news productions (Barkho and Richardson 2010; Kniep 2015). Due to the 
limited scope of this study however, the main objective is to understand how this mediation 
is actually practiced, how it is encoded in the stylistic, linguistic and visual manifestations 
of the news discourses. Within this section, the data and the research methodology will be 
discussed in more details.  
 
 
5.1 Data 
 
There are several reasons that explain why Haaretz and CNN were chosen for analysis in 
this study. First, both news outlets are considered as being rather consistently liberal in the 
ideological spectrum, in compared with a myriad of other networks in their states (The 
Guardian 2014; Pew Research Center 2014). Second, their reporting of the Israel–Palestine 
conflict(s) throughout the past decades has been among the most fruitful and active, as a 
result, they both have been placed under scrutiny when it comes to discussions concerning 
the media coverage of the Israel–Palestine conflict. Thus past studies have demonstrated 
that both news outlets take on certain political stances when it comes to this controversial 
issue (Ozohu-Suleiman 2014). But what actually makes it rather interesting when 
juxtaposing the two outlets to each other is their connections with the main actors of the 
conflict, which can be illustrated in the following diagram:  
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Diagram 3: Haaretz and CNN’s positions during the Gaza war 2014 
  
The concept of a left-wing, right-wing press simply denotes the pragmatics of a political 
mapping (White 2010). These notions carry different perceptions ranging from country to 
country, implying the political ideology presupposed by the press and additionally, the type 
of consumers predominantly presented in their shares of audience. Therefore, when 
assessing the news network’s position in the war, there are many questions to consider: 
Who are their target readers? What are their editorial directives? What external factors 
might influence their editorial policy? What are their news values? How much influence do 
they have over the public and their government? By mapping the position of a newspaper 
or a news agency in the conflict, we can have a general macrosociological estimation of 
their connection with the conflict actors which can fetter the discursive structure of the 
news content and may one way or another affect the coverage of the war. As the 
relationship between the press and their government has been thoroughly researched and 
theorized, hence reaffirmed, it proves to be the key factor that shapes the media’s ideology 
and political stance on a conflict. Perhaps this is something to bear in mind when gauging 
the media’s accountability and transparency in reporting conflict.  
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5.1.1 Haaretz & CNN 
 
Ever since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Hebrew press has always 
been an integral and indispensable part in shaping the public opinion, contributing to the 
“Jewish revival in the land of Israel” (Gilboa 2008: 88). During the 1980s however, the 
Israeli media-scape undertook vast structural transformation, including deregulation, 
privatization and advancement of new technologies (ibid. 88). Politically indoctrinated 
party newspapers and public television channels were replaced by the new media, more 
independent and more commercial, which quickly stormed a country where press 
censorship by the military had been formerly exercised (Kniep 2015: 2). Interestingly, the 
increasing popularity and influence of new privately-owned newspapers and broadcasting 
companies are also translated into their greater involvement in the political arena.  
 
Founded in 1918, Haaretz (“The Land”) is Israel’s oldest daily newspaper and it was later 
purchased by the Schoken family in 1937, who has owned the media group ever since 
(Noam 2015: 949). Haaretz was among the first media groups in the country to establish 
online news portals both in Hebrew and in English, having set up the latter in 1997 to target 
the English-speaking immigrants, foreign reporters, businessmen and diplomats based in 
Israel (Gilboa 2008: 90). Crediting itself as an independent daily “with a broadly liberal 
outlook” (Haaretz 2001), Haaretz tries to associate with an elite, intellectual readership. 
Despite having modest market share and circulation, stalling at around six percent for 
weekday exposure (Kniep 2015: 12), Haaretz’s reputation as “the newspaper for thinking 
people” (Madmoni-Gerber 2009: 45) might speculate bigger influence than its circulation 
suggests.  
 
Against the backdrop of the country’s ongoing internal conflict and friction with 
neighboring Middle East nations, the need to cultivate an independent media climate to 
monitor and assess political processes parallels the demands that Israeli journalists be 
attached to the national, collective interests (Kniep 2015: 2). When it comes to these 
regional conflict issues, especially issues related to settlements and conflicts with 
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Palestinians, whereas the dominant voices in the Israeli media scene remain conservative 
and pro-establishment (Madmoni-Gerber 2009: 45), Haaretz’s op-ed, editorial pages are by 
contrast known to profess a vehement anti-occupation stance, oppositional and critical of 
their government’s actions (Peri 2004: 239). Amos Schoken, the newspaper’s current 
owner and publisher, is committed to end Israel’s occupation of Gaza, the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem, and is out-spoken on issues such as press freedom, minority rights, and 
exposure of military abuses (Remnick 2011). Although this may have earned Haaretz an 
international prestige, the oppositional, hardline criticism of the Israeli government’s 
military actions and the publication of sensitive information in the time of crisis have 
deprived the newspaper of economic and symbolic capital in their home country. Kniep’s 
study on the media accountability in Israel has found that Haaretz is one of the few 
newspapers refusing political collaboration with the state, thus retaining a high place in the 
autonomous pole, weathering its enduring financial struggles. (Kniep 2015: 14) In a 
country where voices of discord are on the margin, where the few journalists publicly 
criticizing the war, the occupation are called out as “traitor” on the street (Gideon and 
Levac 2014), it might perhaps be all the more necessary for dissidence to exist. 
 
However, there are laws and regulations that the Israeli press is compelled to, which 
somewhat influence their reporting of any subjects related to national security. These are 
the law on licensing, the military censorship, the libel law, the gag order, all those regulate 
and at the same time hamper the freedom of expression in Israel (Kniep 2015: 15). The gag 
order, for instance, has been applied in multiple occasions in order to censor news on Israeli 
authorities (Kniep 2015: 15) or sometimes even information concerning the Palestinian 
affair (Berger 2016). As Israeli Defense Forces exert much influence on virtually most 
aspects of the Israeli society, the media not exempted, there exists a special tie between 
them (Kniep 2015: 17). Under this power-knowledge relation, a form of Gramscian 
hegemony is exercised, in which news reporting is not governed in a manipulative or 
repressive manner, but follows the basis of a “collaborative self-censorship” to back what is 
considered the national efforts for security (ibid. 17).  
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For an independent press like Haaretz, these rules and regulations are yet to be the singular 
obstruction, as its journalists also confront other challenges including the physical 
restrictions of covering conflict-affected areas in the region. In particular, Israeli journalists 
have been barred from entering Gaza Strip since 2007, while this had not been the case 
before Hamas seized the now blockaded enclave (Malsin 2014). During the last Gaza war 
in 2014, this ban was still in effect. Consequently, a large portion of Haaretz’s news reports 
and articles on the war had to resort to citations of foreign press (Remnick 2011), which 
inevitably affects the quality of reporting, testing the news outlet’s ideological integrity.  
 
The American Cable News Network (CNN), on the other hand, is a recognized global news 
network. The launch of CNN in 1980 by its founder Ted Turner, along with innovations in 
cable and satellite technologies, have opened a new chapter in the history of news 
broadcasting. The globalization of communications and the transnational expansion of 
CNN have contributed to its burgeoning influence on various aspects of the society, 
conferring the redefinitions of concepts such as warfare, terrorism, human rights or refugee. 
During the early years in operation, the television network was however paid little attention 
to by academics and professionals in the journalistic field, and not until its successful and 
preeminent coverage of the first Gulf war 1990–1991 was the weight of its influence 
reckoned and reflected on. Not only did this global expansion of the news network inspire 
other outlets like BBC or NBC to follow the example by extending the scope of their 
newscast, it also contributed to CNN’s growing importance and emergent role as an actor in 
communications and international relations. (Gilboa 2005: 27–28) Much attention was then 
paid to CNN’s influence on the process of policy-making, a phenomenon later coined and 
theorized by scholars in the journalistic field as the “CNN effect”, the content of which was 
deliberated and discussed in great details in the second chapter of this research paper.  
 
While the forte of CNN is its real-time television news coverage, it has gradually evolved 
into a multiplatform network with an international online portal and a radio division. 
Despite competition from other rival news outlets, CNN’s standing and popularity remains 
remarkably steadfast in its home country, the United States. An analysis of the digital 
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traffic data by the Pew research center on the state of the news media in January 2015 finds 
that CNN’s digital population ranks only after that of Yahoo-ABC News, outrunning other 
major news outlets including NBC, Huffington, CBS or the New York Times (Pew 
Research Center 2015: 11). With its digital format consistently in the lead of top online 
entities, CNN’s footing in the global media landscape proves to be diametrically opposite to 
Haaretz, whose digital consumption accounts for much smaller proportion. But likewise 
Haaretz, CNN’s American consumers are mostly liberals, with conservatives relatively 
underrepresented among its audience’s profiles (Pew Research Center 2014). 
 
As research on the CNN effect demonstrates, mainstream Western media have the upper-
hand in terms of influence on their government’s attention and decisions to intervene in a 
conflict (Gilboa 2005: 29; Puddephatt 2006: 6). This has been the case for CNN. While the 
failure to address the needs of average American audience to focus on national issues in the 
time of a global recession has resulted in its recent loss in revenues to Fox News or 
MSNBC (Holcomb, Mitchell and Rosenstiel 2011), CNN has long been esteemed for its 
coverage of international affairs, channeling its interest towards the country’s involvement 
abroad. This is proliferated in its up-to-the-minute reportage of the Middle East, drawing on 
issues such as the Arab Spring or the Israel–Palestine conflict. The main challenge for CNN 
then, is how to engage its domestic audiences with the international issues that it covers. A 
tactic that appears to be common among the most powerful international media whose main 
targets are North America and Europe is to locate “a point of identification” in the conflict 
they need their audiences to take heed of (Puddephatt 2006: 6).  
 
In covering the Israel–Palestine conflict, CNN’s reportage is navigated from a position 
quite different to that of Haaretz. Israel is the U.S.’ “staunch ally” (Said 2000: 194), and has 
been the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign aids since World War II, most of them 
in the form of military assistance (Sharp 2015: 2). Stout congressional support for Israel 
also means that it enjoys benefits that are not available for any other countries (Sharp 2015: 
20). The Israel–U.S. alliance is in fact, crucial to the U.S.’ foreign policy in the Middle East 
where the U.S.’ involvement in the region has not really been well-received. Though not a 
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Western country, Israel is looked upon as the key factor that mediates the Western view 
towards the Islamic world. In addition, Israel’s security in the region, from the American 
perspective, becomes “conveniently interchangeable with fending off Islam” (Said 2000: 
194). Even though the U.S.’ Mideast policy’s pivot to Israel has been going on for decades, 
little attention has been brought to critically examine this relation. This negligence, 
especially by the U.S. mainstream media, has effectively stifled any alternative and 
oppositional voices on the issue. (Peterson 2015: 50) 
 
As the ideological profiles of CNN’s and Haaretz’s consumers might suggest, readers are 
often prone to the press or journalists sharing the world views and political ideology that 
they identify with. The idea seems to apply to the case of the media covering the Israel–
Palestine conflict, when the content of the articles is sometimes measured based on the 
background and the views of the journalist in particular, and the ideology of the outlet in 
general, on the conflict (Kniep 2015: 21). An analysis of Haaretz’s online comments for 
example, has shown how its readers would criticize first and foremost its “approach” and 
“legacy” on the conflict, before considering the facts being correct or not. The criticism 
levied on Haaretz in this case, is directed at the institution rather than the content of the 
coverage. (Kniep 2015: 21–22) It is interesting then, to put Haaretz and CNN, two media 
with different backgrounds and represented legacies, under the microscope. But while these 
macrosociological observations might prove that media texts are not simply just news and 
facts but constructed entities that contribute to our making-sense of the world, they are not 
sufficient in understanding how ideology is shaped in news discourse, how this mechanism 
functions and organizes, the end goal of which requires an integral structural analysis of the 
properties of news discourse.  
 
 
5.1.2 Data Collection 
 
The data collected for this study were retrieved from the online archives of Haaretz and 
CNN International. The data are a set of articles covering Israel’s military operations in 
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Gaza, also known as operation “Protective Edge”3, operated from July 8 until August 26, 
2014. Given the extensive database of both news outlets on the fifty-day war in Gaza, only 
twelve articles from both Haaretz and CNN are selected for analysis. The articles will be 
divided according to four topics, including (1) the onset of the violence, (2) the battle of 
Shuja’iyya, (3) the rhetoric of terrorist stronghold and lastly, (4) representations of Hamas.  
 
The selection of the data in a non-chronological order, with a focus on the reportage of 
noted events within the course of the military operations, aims to understand how the 
conflict unfolds and the differences in the two outlets’ depictions of specific incidents and 
conflict actors such as Palestinian civilians or Hamas. Note that both news outlets do not 
cover all events on the same day, which may be attributed to various external reasons such 
as time differences or editorial preferences. Haaretz has live updates of the war, every day 
during the course of the military operations, while CNN often prefers to combine different 
news into one piece of article. It is this difference that can explain the discrepancy in terms 
of the content of their news articles, despite the fact the they may have reported on the same 
event or incident. This also proves to be a difficulty in collecting the data, but it no doubt 
offers a look into how news information is processed and performed in different journalistic 
practices and according to different policies.  
 
Due to the limited scope of this study, only news articles will be selected, except for the 
analyses of Hamas, which means that op-eds, editorials, letters to editors, live-updates, 
opinions and agency dispatches will be excluded. As previously mentioned in the first 
chapter of this study, the four above-mentioned topics will be analyzed using different 
methodological approaches in critical discourse analysis (van Dijk 1995a; van Dijk 1988; 
van Dijk 1985). The details of these approaches will be delivered in the next section, but 
the collection of the articles for the study and their corresponding analytical dimensions are 
outlined in the following table:  
 
                                                
3 The military campaign’s codename was set up by the Israel Defense Forces and later it was widely adopted 
by the media to refer to the Gaza war 2014.  
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Table 2: The data collection and dimensions of analysis 
Topics Haaretz CNN Analysis 
Onset of 
the war 
Missing: A responsible 
power to broker Israel– 
Hamas ceasefire 
(Pfeffer July 8th 2014a) 
 
Ground operations in Gaza 
‘might become necessary’, 
Israeli official says 
(Magnay, Payne and Levs 
July 8th 2014) 
Thematic & 
schematic 
structure (van 
Dijk 1985) 
The battle 
of 
Shuja’iyya 
 
In Gaza, a war of two 
narratives  
(Pfeffer July 20th 
2014b) 
Hamas claims it captured an 
Israeli soldier; Israel says no 
(Levs, Brumfield and 
Penhaul July 20th 2014)  
Macro-semantics 
and local 
semantics (van 
Dijk 1995a; van 
Dijk 1988; van 
Dijk 1985) 
Rhetoric of 
terrorist 
stronghold 
 
Israel bombs empty 
Gaza hospitals, calling it 
Hamas commander 
center 
(Cohen, Hass and 
Khoury July 23rd 2014)  
 
Gazan tries to answer 
his son’s question: Who 
broke the house?  
(Hass July 29th 2014a) 
Is Hamas using human 
shields in Gaza? The answer 
is complicated  
(Martinez July 23rd 2014) 
 
 
 
U.N. shelter in Gaza hit: 16 
dead 
(Penhaul, Payne and Fantz 
July 25th 2014) 
Local semantics 
(van Dijk 1995a; 
van Dijk 1988) 
Hamas  Hamas is looking for a 
way out 
(Bar’el July 8th 2014a) 
 
Hamas too stands to win 
from a cease-fire with 
Israel  
(Bar’el July 15th 2014b) 
What is Hamas’ end game 
in Gaza? 
(Castillo July 23rd 2014) 
 
Gaza crisis: Who’s who in 
Hamas? 
(Mullen and Todd July 15th 
2014) 
Local semantics 
(van Dijk 1995a) 
 
First, for the data on the onset of the war, a topical analysis of the news discourses (van 
Dijk 1985) will be applied in order to find out how topics of the events are organized in the 
articles. Although both Haaretz and CNN publish more than one story on the first day of 
operation Protective Edge, only two articles are selected for their comparable length and 
content (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014; Pfeffer 2014a).  
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Second, for the media coverage of the battle of Shuja’iyya (Pfeffer 2014b; Levs, Brumfield 
and Penhaul 2014), the study will employ a macro-semantic structure analysis along with a 
micro-semantic assessment of lexical choices, perspective and multimodal properties (van 
Dijk 1995a; van Dijk 1988; van Dijk 1985). The choice to apply a macrosemantic analysis, 
combined with an analysis of two dimensions of discourse semantics, stems from an 
interest in understanding how the main event, as well as the conflict actors, are represented 
on the news.  
 
Third, in the subchapter on the rhetoric of terrorist stronghold, the study aims to find out 
how the rhetoric of home and terrorist cell, of civilian and militant, of warning leaflets and 
human shields are expressed on the news outlet. The data are four articles central to the 
subject, even though they do not report the same events or follow a chronological order 
(Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014; Hass 2014a; Martinez July 23rd 2014; Penhaul, Payne and 
Fantz July 25th 2014). Due to the specific rationale, the analysis is limited to three 
dimensions of discourse semantics which are lexical style, perspective and position (van 
Dijk 1995a; van Dijk 1988).  
 
Fourth, the study will look into the representations of Hamas on the news by looking into 
the discourse semantics (lexical style, propositional structures, level of specificity and 
degree of completeness) and multimodal properties (van Dijk 1995a) of four articles 
devoted to Hamas (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b; Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014). The 
aim is to understand how the group, their members, their actions and their goals are 
represented. The four articles chosen for analysis tell specific descriptions and profiles of 
the organization, meaning that they are not simply news, but analytically structured.    
 
 
5.2 Critical Discourse Analysis  
 
Recent research on media has shown a shift from traditional, empirical studies of media 
texts that mainly apply quantitative methods such as content analysis towards qualitative 
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studies of the “contextualization” and the “localization” of meaning of news discourse, 
weighing on its broader social, cultural and political significance. There is an emphasis on 
media texts within critical linguistics, but the integration of both structural and sociological 
methods suggests an interdisciplinary approach to the texts in order to have an insight into 
how properties of the news discourse operate under social and institutional constraints. Due 
to its growing and widespread popularity, the online press has received more attention 
within critical analysis of news discourse in compared with other news genres such as 
television or radio. (Wodak and Busch 2004: 106–108) 
 
 
5.2.1 Aims and Ethics of CDA 
 
Critical linguistics, or more recently referred to as critical discourse analysis (CDA), is 
rooted in sociolinguistics, as well as applied linguistics and pragmatics. It takes a keen 
interest in the relations between language and power, as a result, the issues of power, 
dominance, hegemony, ideology, inequality, racism and other sociological variables play a 
crucial role in analysis and interpretation of the text. (Wodak and Busch 2004: 108) The 
questions of how news discourse is (re)produced to distribute dominance and ideology, 
how the process of news production can be seen as an institutional production of discursive 
and social power are central to CDA research. The job of discourse analysts is to 
investigate the strategies, the structure, the organization of textual, verbal, visual properties 
of communicative events in order to understand how processes of (re)production operate 
(van Dijk 1993: 250). In the words of Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, whose works 
in the field pioneer CDA scholarship, language is seen as a “form of social practice” that 
emphasizes the dialectics between discursive events and background categories including 
the context, the institution, and the socio-political structure: it is shaped by these categories, 
but at the same time, it also helps to shape them (1997: 258).  
 
For critical discourse analysts, “language indexes power, language expresses power”, while 
power itself is not derived from language, but people make use of language to generate and 
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enact power (Wodak and Busch 2004: 109). Thus CDA is motivated by social issues 
concerning power relations, which it aspires to understand by analyzing discourse. For van 
Dijk, while the subject under study of critical analysts may solely be the text, it requires 
them to take a specific “sociopolitical stance”, as critiques of the language that legitimizes, 
endorses and sustains inequality and dominance presuppose an applied ethics (van Dijk 
1993: 252). Public spaces, academia, textbooks, political speeches and especially the media 
are strategic instruments that can be utilized to (re)produce ideology and dominance, 
making them specific entities of interest for critical analysts.   
 
The majority of research on the role of the media in sustaining power and ideology look 
from this sociological angle, regardless of the differences in approaches or methods of 
analysis. Studies from a macrosociological perspective, for instance, focus on the 
institutional, socio-cultural and professional context of news production, which has been 
briefly brought forth in the first part of this chapter as this research paper attempts to make 
some observations regarding the relations of the two main subjects Haaretz and CNN with 
the main actors of the conflict that they cover. Microsociological analysis, on the other 
hand, aims to assess journalistic processes, given rules and regulations, along with the news 
values and the ideology that altogether govern the news production. Much attention is also 
paid to the content, the style and the form of news items, as well as their socio-cultural 
significance and influence. (van Dijk 1985: 70–71) More recent is the analysis of comments 
and reactions of the audience to news articles, as the concurrent trend in media studies 
reflects on the media–audience interaction where readers are no longer looked upon as 
decoders of “fixed meanings” but actively participating in the process of negotiating the 
meaning of the message (Wodak and Busch 2004: 106). Textual analysis of news discourse 
however, mainly takes heed of textual and verbal semiotics, syntax, stylistics, lexical 
components and rhetoric, purely from a linguistic perspective. The goal of CDA is the 
integration of both methods, from both sociological and structural perspectives, as the 
advancement of linguistic and discourse analysis has shown how analysis of textual 
elements without their context of construction and vice versa is incomprehensive and “half 
of the story”. (van Dijk 1985: 71)  
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Given that direction, this study employs a critical discourse analysis methodology based on 
Teun van Dijk’s structural framework for news analysis with an expansion on properties of 
the news discourse including not just texts, but also images, videos, and their overall 
composition in the news item, looking from a peace journalism perspective. CDA 
scholarship departing from a peace journalism angle is no doubt singular in terms of their 
focus on conflict reportage, as the study argues that the news outlets’ ideology and editorial 
navigation have a huge influence on the structural organization of the news discourse. This 
is why in order to qualify whether the product of the press in question is war journalism or 
not, it is necessary to understand their way of words, their mechanism, their structural 
approach to the news, all those can explain how socio-political, ideological and institutional 
constraints impose on the news discourse.  
 
 
5.2.2 Theoretical and Methodological Framework  
  
The focuses of the structural analysis of news discourse are the thematic structure and the 
schemata. Due to the complexities of the textual layer, such research often excludes 
analysis of syntactical, lexical, semantic, stylistic and rhetoric properties of the text. In 
other words, the focus is on the macro-organization rather than the micro-features of the 
discourse. The thematic structure of news discourse is the coordination of global topics of 
the news, therefore, it indicates the general content of the news. Schemata, theoretically 
coined as the superstructure, on the other hand, present the news schema, the form of news 
discourse. (van Dijk 1985: 69)  
 
Take, the Headline, for instance. The headline is often placed at the top of the news item, 
formatted in big and bold text, and often used to highlight the most significant subject of 
the news item. The fixed form of the headline is in fact strategically utilized by the majority 
of news outlets as an “expedient signal” that presents the information considered to be the 
most important of the news content. For readers, the headline is used as a macrostrategy to 
conjecture “a provisional topic” of the news item, which can be quickly grasped without 
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having to go through the whole text. If the headline does not adequately summarize the 
content and message of the text, it can be inferred that it is biased. The example simply 
illustrates the idea how the thematic and schematic structures of news discourse are closely 
interrelated. (van Dijk 1985: 77) 
 
That said, news stories often follow a “relevance structure” that tells the readers which 
information is the most important, which information is the latest, the links, causes and 
consequences of an event. News editors or journalists have the power to organize the 
relevance structure of the news item and which thematic structure is the most valuable, as 
the lower level thematic structure often follows the higher level thematic structure. In this 
way, the news content expresses news values by following a hierarchy of topics selected. 
Many outlets apply a principle of recency that seems to be useful for the thematic structure 
of the article. The general principle of recency is that, latest news is often prioritized, which 
is why the results or consequences of an event are usually placed at the beginning of the 
news item, succeeded by the conditions that might have contributed to the creations of the 
problem. This principle may explain why many news stories may not abide to a 
chronological order but rather follow the thematic structures prearranged. (van Dijk 1985: 
78–83) 
 
The superstructure, or the news schemata, on the other hand, is the macrosyntax of the 
news discourse. While the thematic structures of the news item select the news topics that 
the article discusses, news schemata organize the overall content of the news, which 
explains why news schemata are sometimes referred to by linguistics as the “story 
grammar”. Story grammar helps to construct, narrate the story, consisting of “a set of 
characteristic categories” and “a set of formation rules”. News categories are for instance, 
the Headline which as previously mentioned is usually formatted in a specific way, or the 
Main Event of a news story. According to van Dijk, there are also Background, Context, 
Quotation (or Verbal Reactions), Consequences, and Comments. (van Dijk 1985: 84–85) 
Based on the tentative categories of news discourses that van Dijk assumed, we can 
establish the order of the news schema as follows: 
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Figure 2: Order of news schemata 
 
This order is nonetheless looked upon by van Dijk as a rather formal system that varies 
according to preferences of news outlets or news cultures. It is “context-bound” and “goal-
directed”, and even considered as an “expedient” strategy in the process of news 
production. (van Dijk 1985: 89) For van Dijk, the organization of news schemata in fact, 
expresses a cognitive value, in the sense that it facilitates readers’ comprehension and 
processing of information and in many ways proves to be of great use for storage and 
retrieval of information from memory (ibid. 92). Though specific, such structural analysis 
of the news is not however confined in the examination of the thematic and schematic 
structures of news discourse.  
 
News discourse contains other high-level properties such as local semantics or coherence, 
meaning the connection between sentences and paragraphs or stylistic and rhetorical 
dimensions (van Dijk 1988: 2). News discourse exhibits a general but very distinctive 
organization compared with other types of discourses (ibid. 2), as each news story is a 
combination of both textual and structural elements. Analyzing the stylistic phenomena, 
including, but not limited to, lexical and syntactic formulation, semantic properties such as 
presuppositions, implications and associations help to understand how the meaning of 
words and their stylistic expressions can produce and sustain media bias (ibid. 270). Due to 
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its limited scope, the study chooses to look into some specific dimensions of microsemantic 
structures of news discourse while neglecting many others. In particular, it will examine 
lexical choices, perspectives, positions, propositional structures and level of specificity and 
degree of completeness of news discourses concerning the battle Shuja’iyya, the rhetoric of 
terrorist stronghold and representations of Hamas.   
 
Lexicalization is a dimension of discourse that ideologically selects a meaning of the word 
out of a possible many. Depending on various factors from discourse genres to political 
ideologies, language users have a number of options to describe a group of people, 
individuals, or events. (van Dijk 1995a: 259) Another dimension frequented in news reports 
is perspective. Journalists and/or editors might introduce a rather different version of reality 
by presenting it from their personal point of view or by quoting sources that are deemed 
credible. This means that one perspective might be considered more valuable than others, 
therefore, it is cited more frequently while other perspectives are downplayed and 
sometimes ignored. (van Dijk 1988: 272) Even when facts form the basis of the news, 
newspapers or outlets can still impose their ideology on readers by taking a position when 
telling the news story.  
 
On the other hand, the propositional framing of a social group takes place when the group 
is consistently identified as the responsible agent of negative actions which add up to its 
representations. The hyperbolic emphasis of their negative actions and follow-up negative 
evaluations thus ideologically contribute to a semantic structure of the Enemy. The reverse 
is also true for Us, our side, when positive actions are regularly associated with Us being 
the responsible agent. Our negative actions are meanwhile understated and euphemized, 
and that these negative actions happen only because we are forced and obliged to do so. For 
van Dijk, construction of such preferred models is part of the production of meaning, with 
ideological propositions forming a structural transparence in which actors affliated with 
negative actions generally take part in the models and their semantic structures, 
contributing to a “consistently biased discourse”. (van Dijk 1995a: 261–262) Additionally 
in a news discourse, information less important and often not needed might be included in 
60 	
the news item to denote argumentative, rhetorical and even ideological implications and 
representations of an event or actors. The construction of such argumentation, according to 
van Dijk, indicates the level of specificity and degree of completeness of the news 
discourse. (van Dijk 1995a: 275) 
 
A drawback in van Dijk’s proposed framework of structural analysis of news discourse, 
however, is the exclusion of non-linguistic properties including videos and images. Kress 
and van Leeuwen’s theory of the grammar of visual design (1996) has proved that the 
compositional structure of the image can contribute greatly to readers’ attention of one 
thing over another, hence, affects the overall interpretation of the news item. They develop 
a taxonomy of the visual that helps to understand the readings of press images, the grammar 
of visual design from the coloring, the perspective, the framing to the compositional 
patterns of multimodal properties of news discourse. They believe that these multimodal 
texts, with their “representational” and “interactive” elements, are organized in the news 
item in a way that make them all connected to each other. (1996: 176) 
 
According to Kress and van Leeuwen, composition indicates (1) an information value 
which is the placement of the elements with distinct informational values, (2) salience or 
the capacities to attract the viewer’s attention and finally, (3) the framing of the image 
(1996: 117). The image alone toys with diverse interpretations but the image in 
composition, framed, captioned and positioned within the news item, is subjected to a 
limited and expected spectrum of interpretations. Barthes argues that “the press photograph 
is a message”, with the text, the caption, the lay out, altogether constituted in forming a 
selected meaning from many possible ones out of the image (1977: 15). The photograph 
placed in a news article is not structurally isolated but always in conjunction with these 
elements (ibid. 16). Given the changes in contemporary journalistic practices, rarely is any 
news item published without either a photograph or a video, the aim of which is to 
illustrate, to affirm, to make a point. Thus the increasing use of the visual in today’s 
journalism suggests that it has an indispensable role in shaping and facilitating readers’ 
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understanding of the news, indicating a necessity to include the visual in the structural 
analysis of news discourse. 
 
Besides news discourse, newspaper and magazines, according to van Dijk, also utilize 
editorials to express a collective opinion, meaning that editorials can be regarded as the 
voice of the newspaper. Editorials are based on general social observations and 
representations, rather than personal opinion of the editor or the journalist. They are 
sometimes considered a genre of news discourse but more commonly grouped together 
with opinions, letters to editors, letters of complaints or columns into categories of opinion 
discourse. Their function is mainly to formulate and express opinions about a recent news 
event, but editorials and opinion pieces also exhibit discursive and persuasive values which 
are no doubt ideologically oriented. (van Dijk 1995b) In the following analysis and 
discussion, the study will also briefly look into the type of articles as well as the use of 
foreign dispatches of both news outlets in an attempt to understand their editorial lines 
which can contribute to readers’ receptions of the news.   
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6 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter presents analysis and discussion of articles collected from Haaretz and CNN 
online. The data are outlined and divided into four sets with different subject matter and 
analysis intentions, namely the onset of the armed conflict, the battle of Shuja’iyya, the 
rhetoric of terrorist stronghold and the representations of Hamas. These topics are analyzed 
using van Dijk’s framework of critical analysis of news discourse. Much attention will be 
paid to the structure of the news, along with discourse semantics and compositional patterns 
of multimodal texts. The analysis proceeds with first, an overview of the two outlets’ 
editorial preferences, followed by other subsections that look into the coverage of the 
events noted.  
 
 
6.1 Editorial Preferences  
 
Due to political and ideological differences, both news outlets have distinctive approaches 
in covering the events during the war, which we will consider a difference in terms of 
editorial preferences. Haaretz, for instance, as an Israeli press, prioritizes any information 
concerning the war, with a 24-hour live update from the battlefield, each day during the 
course of Israel’s military operations in Gaza. A large portion of the news published on 
Haaretz online during this period are either directly or indirectly linked to the armed 
conflict, which is comprehensible considering that it was regarded as a matter of national 
security and of great emergency. Around the end of Phase One of operation Protective 
Edge (airstrikes), from July 8 to July 16, until the beginning of Phase Two (ground 
invasion), from July 17 onwards, Haaretz publishes on average eighteen news items per 
day, solely devoted to any news regarding the military operations and Gaza (see Table 3). 
This number excludes live updates, opinions, letters to editors, features, blogs, analyses, 
editorials and interviews.  
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Table 3: Number of news articles relating to the war published on both outlets 
during Phase One of the operation 
 
Date of publication Haaretz CNN Note 
July 8 8 3 Haaretz: 2 live updates, 2 opinions, 1 cartoon  
July 9 18 3 Haaretz: 1 live update, 3 opinions, 1 blog  
July 10 10 3 Haaretz: 1 live update, 3 opinions, 3 blogs, 1 letter to editor 
July 11 15 1 
Haaretz: 1 live update, 1 feature, 4 
opinions, 1 analysis, 1 blog, 1 letter to 
editor, 1 editorial 
July 12 11 1 Haaretz: 1 live update, 1 opinion 
July 13 24 1 Haaretz: 1 live update, 1 blog, 2 opinions, 1 analysis, 1 editorial 
July 14 27 2 
Haaretz: 1 live update, 2 features, 4 
opinions, 2 blogs, 1 daily photo, 1 
editorial 
July 15 22 3 Haaretz: 1 live update, 7 opinions, 1 podcast, 1 letter to editor 
July 16 28 2 
Haaretz: 1 live update, 6 opinions, 1 blog, 
1 analysis, 1 cartoon, 1 editorial, 1 
interview 
 
CNN, on the other hand, assembles around one to three articles per day even during the 
peak period of fighting which is the few days before Phase Two of the operation (see Table 
3). This does not necessarily mean that there is less attention to details in one over another, 
it may however indicate editorial choices. CNN’s news articles are generally longer but 
constantly updated, with a tendency to merge two or more events which are thematically 
relevant into a single news item, as exemplified by its coverage of the first day of the war 
(Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014) which will be analyzed in greater details in the next part of 
the analysis. On the other hand, Haaretz is prone to sunder news of different events into 
different items, which explains the large quantity of articles published. In this way, while 
news articles on CNN seem to be more compact, those of Haaretz are more subject-
specific.  
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Moreover, the two outlets’ journalistic styles are also comparatively distinctive in terms of 
their types of articles as well as the use of foreign agencies and correspondents’ reports. 
Haaretz’s signature, as mentioned in the brief introduction of the newspaper, is its op-ed 
pages and editorial lines. As can be seen in Table 3, the outlet publishes a number of blogs, 
opinions, editorials and letters to editors on a day-by-day basis alongside the news items, 
with an average of six items per day during Phase One of the operation. These types of 
articles are however virtually absent on CNN online edition. Editorials are routinely 
published on Haaretz, notably during the few days prior to the commencement of Israeli 
forces’ ground incursion into Gaza on July 17, 2014. The dominant type of articles on 
CNN, by contrast, is news articles.  
 
A glimpse through the reportage of the two news outlets of the military operations in Gaza 
reveals that Haaretz is more dependent on foreign sources compared with CNN. Haaretz 
cited and reposted texts, images and especially videos from a number of international 
agencies for their news articles, while this is not the case for CNN. The fact that Israeli 
journalists were barred from Gaza during operation Protective Edge (Malsin 2014) can 
explain the resort to foreign dispatches, which proves to be an inevitable disadvantage for 
the news outlet. As a result, the majority of Haaretz’s non-agency news reports locate in 
Israel. CNN, on the other hand, has correspondents in Jerusalem and in Gaza, thus they 
were able to obtain information from both sides. The role of perspectives in shaping and 
narrating the news story will be analyzed later in this chapter.  
 
 
6.2 Onset of the War  
 
Rockets had been exchanged between Israeli and Palestinian forces days before the military 
operations, but the beginning of the war is widely assumed to coincide with the first day of 
Israel’s operation Protective Edge in Gaza. Still the starting date of the war remains 
unclear, as articles on the first day of the operation from a number of major news outlets 
such as Haaretz, the New York Times or the Guardian are dated July 8 (Haaretz 2014b; 
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Yourish and Keller 2014; Associated Press 2014), while CNN and Israeli official source 
say July 7 (Khadder, Wedeman and Mullen 2014; State of Israel 2015: vii). Despite being a 
source of confusion, the difference should not be a matter of great concern when 
considering the analogy of the news stories. After all, the purpose of analyzing the first day 
of the military operation is to understand how the conflict unfolds, how the events leading 
to the war are presented on the news.  
 
During the few days just before the war, news of a Palestinian teen’s murder and torture by 
Israeli extremists as a revenge for the kidnap and murder of three Israeli teens was widely 
reported on Haaretz (Hasson 2014; Hasson and Levinson 2014), while on CNN it is 
included in articles about the military operations such as in the article chosen for analysis in 
this part (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014). Later, the tensions and escalating situations 
between Israeli forces and Hamas led the Israeli security cabinet to expand the scale of the 
airstrikes, call up reservists, step up attacks against Hamas, which eventually resulted in the 
launch of a new military operation later known as operation Protective Edge (Ravid and 
Cohen 2014). It is interesting to see how the background of the military operations is 
covered on both news outlets as it is an important category in mapping the causes of the 
war, especially for readers.  
 
 
6.2.1 Thematic and Schematic Structure Analysis of CNN’s Article 
  
During the first day of the war, CNN published three articles about the event (Wedeman 
2014; Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014; Mullen 2014). The first one, which is also the article 
that will be dissected in this section, assembles latest information on the development of the 
operation (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014). The other two articles tell details relevant to the 
armed conflict, with one structured like a question-and-answer item (Wedeman 2014) and 
the other a compilation of experts and analysts’ opinions on the escalating situation in Gaza 
(Mullen 2014). Even though CNN’s amount of articles on the war may be less compared 
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with that of Haaretz, the content of their individual article says quite the opposite, that the 
news network is in fact rather resourceful in terms of materials concerning the operation.  
 
CNN’s articles are mostly multimodal, with visual data including videos, images and 
sometimes even maps making frequent presence on each of their news items. The use of 
visual data on CNN proves to be a journalistic strategy that can enhance the effects and the 
urgency of the issues in depiction. Thus multimodal texts are employed in many of CNN’s 
reports of the conflict, regardless of the types of article, contributing greatly to the 
distinctive structure of the outlet’s news reports. Likewise, the article under analysis 
(Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014) contains not just textual but also visual properties 
including one main video captioned “Israel raises shield against rocket attacks”, along with 
nine other videos in thumbnail visibly aligned in the sidebar, a map of Israel and a photoset, 
all compressed in a single news item (see Picture 1 and Appendix 1).  
 
 
 
Picture 1: Screenshots of parts of CNN’s article (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014) 
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CNN’s main headline of the first day of the conflict quotes an Israeli official’s statement of 
a possible, upcoming ground invasion as an expansion of the military campaign, even 
though this is only the first day of IDF’s airstrikes on Gaza (see Table 4). There is an 
implication of an increasingly worrying situation that is about to be made more intense, 
more violent. The headline alone also suggests the idea that Israeli forces’ spearheading to 
the state of more violent, the ground invasion, might as well be the last resort but after all, a 
matter of necessity. While the function of the headline in news reports is to summarize the 
news story or to emphasize the most important subject mentioned in the discourse (van Dijk 
1985: 77), it does not seem to be the case of that of CNN. Their main headline does in fact 
refer to one of the story highlights but it might not reflect the main content of the news 
item. The use of an official source in the headline puts gravity on the claim but at the same 
time, it also suggests an inclination towards a single perspective. The article is in fact 
divided into seven subsections covering different topics, most of which are, however, not 
ranked under the story highlights. These seven subsections also have their own headlines 
which summarize the main contents. The headlines are presented as follows:  
 
Table 4: Headlines of CNN’s article (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014)  
 
 Headlines Note/Format 
1 Ground operations in Gaza “might become necessary”, Israeli official says 
main headline, 
big, bold 
2 People “in human shield” killed on Gaza rooftop bold 
3 Israel warnings: Stay away from Hamas bold 
4 Teens’ deaths sparked new violence bold 
5 Long-range threat bold 
6 “Red-lines” crossed bold 
7 Political strains bold 
 
Additionally, this article does not have a lead. Instead, the lead is replaced by the story 
highlights which are situated at the sidebar just under the main headline. The story 
highlights recapitulate the events described in the news and function as expedient signals 
for readers to quickly get hold of the general subject matter of the article. In this sense, their 
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function might be similar to that of the lead. The story highlights express the following 
topics:  
 
Picture 2: Screenshot of CNN’s story highlights and their thematic categories 
(Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014) 
 
The topics of the story highlights express four different themes concerning the conflict 
which are: the casualties of the Israeli airstrikes on Gaza, the claim of a Palestinian armed 
group over rockets fired at Tel Aviv, the deaths of five Hamas members and lastly, Israeli 
official’s statement on a possible expansion of the military campaign. The first story 
highlight indicates the highest topic of the news item which in this case, is the casualties of 
the Israeli airstrikes on Gaza. All of these four topics, even though reported in the same 
article, describe four different events. The headlines of the subsections (see Table 4) show 
how the story highlights employed in this article do not necessarily summarize the news 
events described but only outline some of the latest news that the outlet considers to be the 
most important. 
 
As previously discussed, news events described in the press do not have to follow a 
chronological or causality order but are usually organized according to the principle of 
recency, with the results or consequences of an event being reported first, followed by the 
conditions (history, background, context) and subsections with extra details relevant to the 
main event. First topics are considered to have a higher level thematic structure and they 
Result 
Actor/Cause 
Result 
Reaction 
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usually describe the most recent news or events (van Dijk 1988: 76). Table 5 rounds up the 
complete topic details of CNN’s news article on the first day of the war (Magnay, Payne 
and Levs 2014). The topics listed cover the global semantics of the news content and they 
are arranged in the same order as in the news article on CNN. The topics are broken down 
into seven subsections corresponding to the seven headlines listed above (see Table 4). 
Topic details express information connected to the main topics, with each assigned 
different topical categories such as the result, the consequence, or the reactions of an event.  
 
Table 5: Thematic structure of CNN’s news article (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014) 
 Category  Topic detail(s) 
I a. Results i Israel intercepted rockets 
  ii Israel killed militants entering Israel’s territory through 
Zikim  
 b. Event (1)  Palestinian militants fired more than 130 rockets  
 c. Result (2)  24 Palestinians were reportedly killed, 150 injured 
 d. Cause (2)  Israel said it targeted “150 terror” sites in Gaza 
 e. Verbal reaction (1)  IDF said “Hamas will pay a heavy price” 
 f. Actor/Cause (3)  Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for rockets fired at 
Tel Aviv 
 g. Actor/Cause (1)   Hamas claimed responsibility for rockets fired at 
Jerusalem and Haifa 
 h. Reactions (1) i Israeli Cabinet authorizes the military to call up troops 
  ii Israeli official referred to “possible ground maneuvers” 
 i. Actor/Cause (4)  Hamas claimed it entered Zikim 
 j. Event (4)  Hamas and Israel’s infantry force exchanged fired 
 k. Results (4)  i Five Hamas militants were killed 
  ii One Israeli soldier was slightly wounded 
 l. Event (5)  Hamas blew up tunnel under Karem Shalom  
 m. Consequences (5) i Karem Shalom’s residents were ordered to turn off the 
lights 
  ii Israeli aircrafts hovered and fired above Gaza 
    
II a. Circumstance (1)   Mohammad Sha’aban was killed in an Israeli airstrike  
 b. Actor (1) i Sha’aban is leader of Hamas’ militant wing 
  ii Israel called Sha’aban “a senior Hamas terrorist”  
 c. Result (2)  Some Palestinians were killed in an Israeli airstrike on a 
Gaza rooftop 
 d. Actors (2)  i Palestinian sources said victims formed the “human 
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shields”  
  ii Two of them were children 
 e. Actor (3)  Another victim of Israeli airstrikes was also a child 
 f. Commentary   Israel said Hamas used “human shields” 
    
III a. Reactions i Israel sent messages warning people to steer clear of 
Hamas 
  ii Israel dropped fliers warning Gazans about militant 
activities 
 b. Context  Operation Protective Edge is “part of an effort to restore a 
state security” 
    
IV a. History/Events (1) i Kidnap and killings of three Israeli teenagers sparked 
tensions 
  ii Israel blamed Hamas 
 b. History/Event (2)  Palestinian teen was abducted and killed in Jerusalem 
 c. Event/Result (2)  Israel arrested suspects 
 d. Consequence (2)  The slain Palestinian teen’s cousin was beaten  
 e. Actor (IV. d)  Men in Israeli security uniforms 
 f. History/Event (3)  Israeli Arab confessed to a killing of another Israeli teen 
in May 
 g. Commentary (3)   Israeli police said the killer was motivated by Palestinian 
nationalism 
 h. Reactions (1) i Palestinian president Abbas condemned the killings of 
three Israeli teenagers 
  ii Abbas was criticized by his condemnation  
 i. Verbal reactions 
(I.d) 
i Abbas condemned Israeli airstrikes 
 ii Palestinian spokesman accused Israel of carrying an 
“open massacre” 
    
V a. Context (I.d)  The offensive is to strike Hamas and stop rockets fired at 
civilians 
 b. Event/Result  A rocket hit the city of Hadera 
 c. Reaction   IDF’s position was changed from de-escalation to 
preparing for a deterioration of the situation 
    
VI a. Verbal reaction  Hamas leader Mushir al-Masri said Israel had “crossed 
the lines”  
 b. Consequence   Rockets into Israel increased 
 c. Actor/Cause  Hamas claimed responsibility 
    
VII a. Consequence (1)  The conflict created political strains within Israeli PM’s 
coalition.  
 b. Verbal reactions i Israeli foreign minister Lieberman expressed the intention 
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The first three topics, (I), (II) and (III), cover the development of Israeli military operations. 
Subsequent topics, (V), (VI) and (VII) reflect the verbal, physical reactions and political 
complications of the parties involved. One subsection (IV), however, delves into details of 
the aftermath of the killing and torture of Palestinian teen Mohammed Abu Khdeir. Thus it 
can be seen that CNN applies the principle of recency in which the latest information is 
prioritized and placed at the top of the news item. The seven parts in the news item cover 
different stories but they are connected in a relevance structure. The arrangement of the 
topics in a relevance structure assigns a hierarchy of importance to the topics themselves 
(van Dijk 1988: 76), meaning that the information in the first part (I) of the news is 
considered to be the most important in the article. It is also the result or consequence of the 
military campaign and in fact, the deaths reported are among the first casualties of 
operation Protective Edge.  
 
Within the first part (I) there already exist different levels of importance in which news of 
Palestinian militants firing rockets at Israel (I.b) is ranked as the top event. The article 
however opens with a sentence that briefs about Israel’s intercept of rockets and killings of 
Palestinian militants who tried to enter Israeli territories through Zakim waters (I.a). 
Incident (I.a.i), or “Israel intercepted rockets”, is the direct result of the first event (I.b), 
“Palestinian militants fired more than 130 rockets”, whereas incident (I.a.ii), “Israel killed 
militants entering Israel’s territory through Zikim”, is the result of the fourth event (I.j) 
which is the fighting between IDF and Hamas members at Zikim.  
 
Throughout the article, a series of Event–Consequence–Cause–Reaction is tangled and 
intersected in a complicated but rather coherent manner, without being obliged to the actual 
timeline of the first day of the conflict. One thing these events do have in common is that 
they are all thematically related to the latest developments of the military operations. The 
to dissolve his party’s joint faction with Likud.  
  ii Lieberman criticized Netanyahu.  
 c. Consequence (2)  Tensions increased between Hamas and Palestinian 
Authority in the West Bank.   
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fact that CNN’s news articles are constantly updated (this article’s last update is, for 
instance, July 9, 2014) can explain the compact body of information. Despite the large 
volume, the main macroproposition (topic) concerns the verbal feud and the exchange of 
rockets and airstrikes between Palestinian and Israeli forces (18 topic details) while the 
lower level ones are for instance, the political tensions (04 topic details) or reports of 
civilian casualties (05 topic details). Topic details about the duel between Hamas and the 
IDF occupy high positions in the overall thematic structure. They are reiterated several 
times in the news article and some of these details are even chosen as the story highlights 
(see Picture 2). The reason might be that these events express salience or the quality to 
attract readers’ attention, which at the same time helps to explain why a verbal reaction of 
an Israeli official on the escalating situation is picked out to feature as the main headline.  
 
Part (IV) is the only section that is not directly pertinent to the developments of the armed 
conflict but is connected to the major events of the article, as both main conflict actors, 
Hamas and Israel, also took part in the news stories about the killings and abductions of 
three Israeli and one Palestinian teenagers. There is no direct indication that the killings 
were the cataclysm for the ongoing war but much attention is surely paid to the incidents 
and their aftermaths. In an article about the first day of the war, there are four videos and a 
photoset solely devoted to the incidents of part (IV), over ten videos in total. Even though 
these videos are hyperlinked and put in thumbnail under the title “Related videos”, they are 
well visible at the sidebar (see Appendix 1), which pronounces their significance and 
connection to the main events mentioned in the article. The incidents form the backdrop of 
the armed conflict, but whether or not they are considered the cause and condition of the 
war is left ambiguous. 
 
The organization of the thematic structure of the news article is mapped out in the 
following diagram:  
 
 
73 	
 
 
 
Diagram 4: Schema of CNN’s news report (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014) 
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CNN’s news article on the first day of the military operations is rather rich in materials. 
The information is able to address the basic questions of how, what, where and when the 
war broke out. The “why” question of this war is however, unclear. One thing to consider 
which is that the act of compiling the episodes of fighting, the political wrangles and 
internal disputes, the history of the four teenagers’ deaths altogether into one news article 
about the first day of the war might as well suggest that these events did not happen in a 
vacuum.   
 
 
6.2.2 Thematic and Schematic Structure Analysis of Haaretz’s Article 
 
Haaretz’s first few articles on operation Protective Edge are dated July 8, 2014, as search 
results using this keyword display no match prior to this date (see Picture 3).  
 
 
 
Picture 3: Screenshot of search results using keywords “Operation Protective Edge” 
from July 7 to July 8, 2014 on Haaretz  
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A look through news titles dated the day before of the operation, July 7, 2014, shows that 
there are actually ten items related to Gaza, with two reports specifically describing the 
escalating situation: one about the alarmingly increasing rockets fired at Israeli cities 
(Haaretz 2014c) and the other about IDF calling up reservists to prepare for an expanded 
operation (Ravid and Cohen 2014). On the first day of the war, there are up to twelve items 
concerning Gaza and the military operations, including two live-updates of two consecutive 
days (Haaretz 2014b; Haaretz 2014d), five news heads (Pfeffer 2014a; Bar’el 2014a; Oren 
2014; Ravid 2014; Hass 2014b), one feature (Prusher 2014), two agency dispatches 
(Haaretz 2014e; Koopmans and Ramadan 2014) and two opinions (Dershowitz 2014; 
Levinson 2014). The news items discuss topics concerning the drop in support for 
Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas (Hass 2014b), Israeli security cabinet’s decision to 
escalate the military operation (Ravid 2014), what Israel wants from the war (Oren 2014), 
what Hamas wants from the war (Bar’el 2014a) and lastly, a recap of the sequence of 
events that took place on the first day of the war (Pfeffer 2014a).  
 
From their editorial preferences it can be seen that Haarez tends to combine the latest news 
or events into one master-post which is the live updates of the war, whereas other articles 
categorized as “Israeli news” often entail some analytical dimensions. The article selected 
for this study (Pfeffer 2014a) is no exception to this rule, even though the reason for its 
selection is precisely because of the content that it covers which is the summary and the 
analysis of the main events of July 8. The article is also in fact the news item last published 
at the end of the day.  
 
Unlike CNN, Haaretz’s article on the first day of the war only has one big headline titled, 
“Missing: A responsible power to broker Israel–Hamas cease-fire” (Pfeffer 2014a). There is 
a difference in the main headlines of the two news outlets, as CNN’s headline aims to stress 
an escalating point of the conflict (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014) while that of Haaretz 
looks for a solution for the escalation. Haaretz’s headline appears as a remark, a 
commentary and it satisfies the assumed function of the headline which is to summarize the 
content of the article or emphasize the most important information of the news. 
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Particularly, the latter part of the article delves into the question of a possible ceasefire 
broker, the details of which are discussed in the topical analysis of the news item (see Table 
6). The article’s lead is placed underneath the main headline in normal font and takes the 
form of a sentence that rationalizes the motive of Hamas behind their engagement in the 
duel with Israeli forces.  
 
(1)  All Hamas has now to try and grab the world's attention and improve its 
standing in the eyes of its people – are its missiles. (Pfeffer 2014a) 
 
A skim through the article shows that the lead is formulated by using one of the sentences 
in the last paragraph of the news item, which serves as an explanation for the Palestinian 
armed group’s decision to join in the fight against Israeli forces.   
 
Haaretz’s article (Pfeffer 2014a) is comparable to that of CNN (Magnay, Payne and Levs 
2014) in terms of content, as it recounts and encapsulates some of the main events that took 
place on the day IDF undertook the airstrike operations. What distinguishes the two is 
Haaretz’s preference to interweave facts with analysis. This difference in journalistic 
practices can thus be attributed to Haaretz’s distinction in terms of the news structure. 
Macropropositions of the ongoing development of the war stretch across the thematic 
structure of the news, with additional information on stages before and during the war and a 
contemplation of what might follow. These are the extra details that altogether work out to 
explain how previous events build up to the armed conflict, along with possible 
consequences of the war.  
 
Table 6: Thematic structure of Haaretz’s news report (Pfeffer 2014a) 
 Category  Topic detail(s) 
1 a. Commentary  Escalation is predictable 
 b. Event  Hamas lost seven members in attacks on tunnel 
 c. Reaction  Hamas fired missiles at Israel 
2 a. Event/Reaction (1)  Israel launches offensives against Hamas 
 b. Result (1)  First civilian casualties 
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Topics concerning the latest developments of the war remain high in the thematic structure 
of the news discourse, as the article opens with descriptions of the main events and their 
results as seen in topics (1) and (2), followed by verbal reactions and commentaries. Even 
 c. Events/Reactions (2) i Hamas and Islamic Jihad fired rockets at Israel 
  ii They attempted to capture an IDF soldier at Zikim beach 
 d. Result (2)  Five Palestinian militants were killed at Zikim 
3 a. Commentary (1)  Hamas acted too quickly 
 b. History (2)  Hamas took longer time for long-range targets 
 c. Time (2)  2009 and 2012 
 d. Analysis (1) i Hamas wants a prize as quickly as possible this time 
  ii Israel thinks this round is more protracted 
4 a. Circumstance  IDF constantly improves its capability 
 b. Predictions i Further retaliation will lead to another cycle of violence 
  ii More civilian casualties in Gaza  
  ii Prolonged misery for Gazans 
5 a. Commentary   The paradigm of Gaza hasn’t changed 
 b. Actor i Hamas has locally manufactured missiles 
  ii Hamas leaders have holed up in bunkers since the 
previous week 
 c. Predictions i A week of more airstrikes won’t deter Hamas 
  ii Disruption of life in Israel  
  iii Major economic losses 
6 a. Verbal reactions i Israeli cabinet exhorts IDF to “finish off Hamas” 
  ii IDF General staff hesitate 
 b. Predictions  Further operations will not be able to eradicate Hamas 
leadership and its missiles 
 c. Predictions/Analysis i Israel will need longer campaign to rid of Hamas 
  ii Israel will have to take care of welfare of Gazans 
7 a. Happening  No ceasefire broker 
 b. Actors i Egyptian new regime hates Hamas 
  ii Turkey has other issues 
  iii The U.S. won’t talk with Hamas 
8 a. Commentary/Actor  Hamas is isolated 
 b. Causes i Egypt cut off most tunnels under Rafah 
  ii Hamas lost its sponsors in the Persian Gulf 
  iii Fatah-Hamas deal is not working 
  iv Hamas faces challenges from Salafi groups 
 c. Result  Hamas grabs attention by its missiles 
 d. Prediction  Hamas will continue the fighting until it achieves its goal 
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though news of the fighting is central to the article, the author does not go into details of the 
tit-for-tat between Hamas and IDF but presents relevant information of the conflict as an 
attempt to explain the background and contextualize the news within the course of recent 
history. Further observations also point to missing statistics such as the number of civilian 
casualties killed on the first day of the fighting. The article instead focuses on the analysis 
of the current situation which is accompanied by a number of commentaries and 
predictions, supposing IDF expands its military operations. The question featured in the 
headline, the absence of a foreign ceasefire broker, is examined in topic (7), as the article 
then concludes with remarks of Hamas’ status quo (8).  
 
From the organization of the thematic structure it can been seen that the article is rather 
unconventional and does not follow the standard format of a news discourse. It is 
informative but at the same time analytical, which makes the format resemble that of an 
analysis piece even though it is defined by Haaretz as “News”. In fact, the outlet does have 
their own distinctive genre of “Analysis”. That said, even though information on the 
fighting between Hamas and Israel still occupies a high position in the relevance structure 
of the news discourse (05 topic details), more room is spared for the categories of 
commentaries, analyses and predictions (13 topic details), which confirms the idea that the 
news article expresses higher analytical value than informative value.  
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Diagram 5: Schema of Haaretz’s news report (Pfeffer 2014a)
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“Schematic superstructures organize thematic macrostructures”, according to van Dijk 
(1985: 69). Thus the events are narrated according to a local coherence of cause–
consequence order, as main events are connected together in a sequence, more or less 
according to the author’s intentions or interpretation of the news. An example of this is the 
decision to use news of Hamas members’ casualties in an attack on the tunnel on the Gaza 
border as a main event rather than the consequence of another event. Accordingly, events of 
the first day of the war are arranged in the following order: (1) Hamas lost seven members 
in an attack on the tunnel, (2) Hamas fired at Israel, (3) Israel launched offensives against 
Hamas, (4) Israeli airstrikes caused Palestinian civilian casualties, (5.a) Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad fired at Israel, (5.b) Palestinian militants entered Zikim and lastly, (6) five Palestinian 
militants were killed by Israeli forces at Zikim.  
 
The choice to construct the events in this order tells the story in a rather different manner 
from that of CNN which resolves to describe episodes of the fighting separately and not in 
a causality order. The events depicted in CNN’s article (Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014), 
though all related to the ongoing development of the war, are perceived to take place 
independently and in fragments. Even though Haaretz’s way of reporting may influence the 
reception of the news, it presents a rather efficient journalistic strategy which enables 
readers to follow the events more easily. It might, nevertheless, run into the risk of being 
biased, as it is clearly based on the author’s interpretation of the news.  
 
Interestingly, despite the fact that both news articles from Haaretz and CNN recap the same 
incidents and events that took place on the first day of the war, their ways of reporting quite 
differ from one another. CNN seems to focus more on the duel between Hamas and Israel, 
as information on the fighting and exchange of fires is emphasized throughout the news 
item, while Haaretz seems to downplay details of these events even as to the point that 
numbers and statistics are not reported. Haaretz does, however, offer a great number of 
commentaries and predictions, showing its interest in finding solutions for the escalating 
conflict between Hamas and Israel. The composition of semantic categories of the 
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development of the war, the political background (history/context), and the follow-up 
analysis of the events altogether makes Haaretz’s article rather structurally complete.  
 
 
6.3 The Battle of Shuja’iyya4 
 
The battle of Shuja’iyya, which took place between July 20 and 24, 2014, witnessed some 
of the deadliest days since the outbreak of the hostilities between Hamas and the IDF. 
Much criticism was waged against Israeli forces’ onslaught on one of the most densely 
populated neighborhoods in the Gaza strip which resulted in a high death toll of Palestinian 
civilians who got sucked into the maelstrom of missiles and artilleries. Few days prior to 
the battle, the IDF began a ground invasion of Gaza as an attempt to target the ground 
tunnels that Hamas members had used. What began as a “limited” ground incursion quickly 
spiraled into a “full-scale” campaign, with Shuja’iyya, situated north of the Gaza strip, 
ultimately bearing the brunt of the intense combats (Yourish and Keller 2014; Pfeffer 
2014b). Israel had their own justification of the assault that was deemed by Palestinians and 
their government as a “heinous massacre” at the expense of at least sixty Palestinian 
civilians (Yourish and Keller 2014). Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu defended IDF’s 
military actions, adding that Israeli forces “only target the sources of terror and this 
[Shuja’iyya] is a source of terror” (Haaretz and Reuters 2014).  
 
What we have come to acknowledge so far is a dispute in terms of narratives, as one side 
mourned the deaths of their civilians while the other claimed that its targets were militants. 
It comes to the press to assume the responsibility of weighing the different claims while 
taking into consideration the accounts of all sides. Given the controversy surrounding the 
incident, the study attempts to analyze the two outlets’ reports of the battle of Shuja’iyya, 
both dated July 20, 2014 (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014; Pfeffer 2014) in order to see 
how the event is narrated and whether the outlets offer any perspectives concerning the 
controversy surrounding the assault.  
                                                
4 Also known as Shaja’ia, Shujaiyeh.  
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The news stories selected for analysis in this section are constructed in the same ways as 
the two articles analyzed in the previous part (see subchapter 6.2). CNN combines different 
but relevant information into one article (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014), while 
Haaretz prefers to focus on one theme which is the fighting in Shuja’iyya (Pfeffer 2014b). 
Since CNN’s article on the subject has a compact body of content, only two parts of the text 
devoted to the events in Shuja’iyya will be used for analysis which are “Gaza battles’ 
deadliest day for both sides” and “Dozens dead in Shaja’ia” (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 
2014).  
 
It is necessary to mention that the choice to boil down the news article into just two 
paragraphs detailing the events in Shuja’iyya affects the overall schematic structure of the 
CNN article. Particularly, when separated from other news events mentioned in the article, 
they present a structure which van Dijk refers to as a “topical kernel”, meaning that only 
the main event, with little or no background information, history, causes or consequences, 
is covered (van Dijk 1988: 82). Haaretz’s item, on the other hand, is structurally similar to 
the previous article sampled in subchapter 6.2, in which facts and follow-up analyses are 
interweaved (Pfeffer 2014b). That said, the major topics covered in both news outlets are:  
 
Table 7: Topics of CNN’s and Haaretz’s news articles on Shuja’iyya (Levs, 
Brumfield and Penhaul 2014; Pfeffer 2014b) 
 
 Topics Note 
1 Israel’s ground assaults led to high casualties in the suburb of Shuja’iyya.  
2 Palestinian casualties were reported.  
3 IDF soldiers casualties were reported.  
4 Israeli official source defended IDF’s military actions.   
5 Palestinian sources condemned IDF’s military actions.   
6 IDF claimed it had already warned residents of Shuja’iyya  only CNN 
 
As can be pointed out, the only topic that CNN covered and that Haaretz did not report, is 
IDF’s claims that it had already distributed flyers and warned Shuja’iyya residents of the 
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upcoming onslaught. This information might as well be categorized and identified as a 
cause that explains the high toll of Palestinian civilian fatalities on this day. Despite being a 
high-level thematic structure in the article, the news of Shuja’iyya is not featured in CNN’s 
headline which instead chooses to disclose a detail of another event about an Israeli solder 
suspected to be captured by Hamas (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014). This decision 
might express the outlet’s preferred news value. CNN’s story highlights do, however, 
mention news concerning Shuja’iyya. The topics mentioned in the story highlights are: (1) 
the current Palestinian death toll thus far, (2) Israeli–American soldiers’ deaths in 
Shuja’iyya, (3) U.S. Secretary of State’s travel to Egypt and (4) the number of Israeli 
soldiers killed on Sunday.   
 
No recap of Palestinian casualties in Shuja’iyya is featured in the story highlights, despite 
the fact that the number of the dead and the wounded recorded on July 20 is the highest in a 
single day ever since the launch of the military operations (Yourish and Keller 2014). The 
same goes for the Israeli side, which by contrast receives a rather different treatment as two 
among the story highlights are devoted to recount the deaths of Israeli soldiers in the Gaza 
neighborhood, two among which are American nationals. One can easily observe an 
imbalance in terms of casualty reporting when one side’s casualties seem to draw more 
attention than those of the other.  
 
The headline on Haaretz (Pfeffer 2014b), on the other hand, can be considered as a 
summary of the article’s content. The article presents both IDF’s defence of their military 
actions and Palestinians’ testimonies of the incident, hence the headline “In Gaza, a war of 
two narratives”. The lead of the article (see Example 2) describes the escalation of IDF’s 
ground invasion from a “limited” to a “full-scale” onslaught on Shuja’iyya (Pfeffer 2014b).  
 
(2) What began on Thursday night as a “limited” ground operation, specifically 
targeting the tunnels in a relatively narrow strip of around 1.5 kilometers 
from the border fence, expanded 48 hours later into a full-scale onslaught on 
Shuja'iyya and its environs. (Pfeffer 2014b) 
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The lead of this Haaretz article is also a sentence extracted from the body of the article, 
which is similar to the case of the Haaretz article on the onset of the war that was analyzed 
in subchapter 6.2. The lead (see Example 2) presents the result and at the same time the 
happening of the main event which is the Israeli ground invasion into Shuja’iyya.     
 
In terms of lexical choices, there exists a difference in the way that the two news outlets 
refer to Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups:   
 
(3) Since beginning ground operations Thursday, Israel said, it has killed at least 
70 terrorists and captured others. (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014) 
 
(4) The IDF claims that, since the start of the ground offensive on 
Thursday night, it has killed around 110 Palestinian militants; military 
sources report that troops are facing stiff armed resistance in Shuja’iyya. 
(Pfeffer 2014b) 
 
Despite the fact that both Haaretz (Pfeffer 2014b) and CNN (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 
2014) cover the same information, there are discrepancies in their reporting which are first, 
the death counts and second, the lexical style. Even though the two articles seem to suggest 
that the “Palestinian militants” and “terrorists” killed by Israeli forces are likely to be 
members of Palestinian armed groups and not just of Hamas, there is an emphasis on the 
latter as they go on to tell further details of the group’s activities. One thing to consider is 
that they both report a statement of an Israeli official source, which assumingly requires 
certain precision and caution of words, especially when this is a paraphrase of a direct 
quotation. The use of “terrorist” instead of “militant” and vice versa, thus, may be 
intentional and may indicate a personal or institutional point of view, especially when 
Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by both Israel and the U.S. (Bar’el 2014a; 
Mullen and Todd 2014). 
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Interestingly, both CNN and Haaretz also mention the fact that the attack in the 
neighborhood Shuja’iyya was called out by Palestinians as “a massacre” whereas Israel 
presented it as a battle against “Hamas’ terror infrastructure”.  
 
(5) But people in Gaza who spoke with CNN painted a difference picture. 
“What is happening is a massacre,” said a resident of the al-Remal 
neighborhood. [...] For three days, the IDF had warned residents of Shaja’ia 
to flee, Israel said. Such warnings are delivered through calls and text 
messages as well as fliers that said “it is the intention of the IDF to carry out 
aerial strikes against terror sites and operatives” in the area. (Levs, 
Brumfield and Penhaul 2014) 
 
(6) Israel is presenting the push as a battle against the hub of Hamas’ terror 
infrastructure [...]. The Palestinians, for their part, are presenting it clear and 
simple as the Massacre of Shuja’iyya [...]. (Pfeffer 2014b) 
 
The wording no doubt reflects the reactions to the event on both sides, as Palestinian 
sources consider IDF’s military action as a deliberate extermination of civilians while IDF 
justifies its actions as a fight against a terrorist stronghold. The rhetoric of “civilian” and 
“militant” casualties and the conflation of the two are routine in the reportage of the 
conflict, and which will be examined in more details later in this chapter. 
 
Given the polarized accounts when it comes to debates concerning the fighting of 
Shuja’iyya, much attention should be paid to the perspectives of all sides of the war. In 
their reportage of the casualties in Shuja’iyya, CNN was able to acquire quotes from both 
Palestinian and Israeli sources, as well as the casualty figures from IDF and the Palestinian 
Health Ministry. The outlet however utilizes different ways to present the casualties from 
both sides.  
 
(7)  Eighty-seven Palestinians died, at least 60 of them in Israel’s assault on the 
town of Shaja’ia, the Gaza Health Ministry said. (Levs, Brumfield and 
Penhaul 2014) 
 
(8) The IDF said 13 soldiers were killed. [...] Among those killed was Max 
Steinberg, a California native, according to the Jewish Federation of Greater 
Los Angeles. Steinberg attended Pierce College and served as a sniper. Sean 
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Carmeli, an IDF soldier from South Padre Island, Texas, was also killed, 
according to Rachel Simony of the Congregation Shoova Israel in South 
Padre Island. (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014) 
 
By introducing the detailed profiles of the two fallen Israeli-American soldiers, one “a 
California native”, one “from South Padre island”, the authors of the CNN’s article are 
effectively able to find a point of identification with its target North American readers 
(Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014). This is not the case for Palestinians whose deaths are 
by contrast summed up in a number without any further details. Such treatment of any news 
relevant to the U.S. context is common in the American press as well as the majority of 
Western press (van Dijk 1988: 74; Puddephatt 2006: 6).  
 
On the other hand, statistics of fatalities are pretty much absent in Haaretz’s article which 
does not even bother to state any exact figures, except for a vague reference of “dozens of 
Palestinians killed”.  
 
(9) According to Palestinian sources, dozens of civilians have killed [sic] in the 
bombed-out houses and streets. (Pfeffer 2014b) 
 
That the article concentrates more on analyzing rather than offering the facts which can be 
referred to from their live updates might as well be a factor for this negligence.  
 
Both news outlets, however, adapt the Israeli perspectives by directly quoting a number of 
Israeli sources. In particular, both articles depend heavily on IDF’s official statements, with 
CNN citing the Israeli forces five times and Haaretz seven times, as presented in Examples 
10 and 11. 
 
(10) But the IDF said Hamas “ordered them to stay” and “put them in the line of 
fire.” (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014) 
 
(11) IDF officers have acknowledged the significant escalation in fighting since 
last night, using descriptions such as “taking off the gloves” and “it’s not an 
operation, it’s a war”. (Pfeffer 2014b) 
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Besides IDF, CNN also quotes Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu two times in 
reference to the battle of Shuja’iyya (see Example 12). Hamas, on the other hand, is cited 
once in the two parts of CNN’s article (see Example 13).  
 
(12) At a news conference, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed 
the country’s “deep pain” at the loss of the soldiers. [...] “We’re doing 
everything we can not to harm the people of Gaza,” Netanyahu added. 
“Hamas is doing everything they can to make sure the people of Gaza 
suffer.” (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014) 
 
(13) Hamas claimed responsibility for the deaths of the Israeli soldiers [...]. The 
attack “destroyed the force completely,” Hamas said, calling it a “heroic 
operation.” (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014) 
 
Even though Hamas and the Israeli P.M. can be viewed as the official sources from both 
Palestinian and Israeli sides, they are cited in a contrastive manner in which one offers his 
condolence to the fallen Israeli soldiers while the other hails the killing of the soldiers as “a 
heroic operation” (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014). Such semantic moves formulate a 
victim–aggressor relationship, emphasizing their negative action which is the killing of the 
Israeli soldiers while at the same time effectively understate our negative action which is 
the killing of Palestinian civilians. These negative values are thus added to the negative 
representations of the Palestinian armed group Hamas. Haaretz, on the other hand, does not 
have any direct quotation from Hamas.  
 
The fact that CNN correspondents were allowed to enter Gaza gives the outlet the benefit 
of a vantage point by being able to access to testimonies from both sides of the conflict. 
This was not the case for Haaretz whose physical restrictions to Gaza already hindered the 
possibility, prompting the outlet to resort to agency dispatches for a large amount of news 
on Gaza. Undeniably, Haaretz’s news article (Pfeffer 2014b) relies largely on data provided 
by Israeli official sources, which can have effects on the authenticity of the information as 
well as the weight of its claims and analysis. An example for this is the discrepancy in the 
number of Hamas members being killed, that Haaretz reports 110 in accordance with the 
Israeli military source while CNN reports 70 (see Examples 3 and 4). The author of 
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Haaretz’s article later resolves to admit that the number of fatalities on both sides are just 
“rumors”.  
 
(14) At this point, there are swirling masses of rumors on both sides of the border 
regarding the number of fatalities. (Pfeffer 2014b) 
 
The numbers and figures mentioned in CNN’s news article paint a more comprehensive 
picture, as estimations of casualties of both Palestinians and Israelis are supplied by 
credible sources of both sides (see Examples 7 and 8). However, when discussing news of 
IDF’s warnings of Shuja’iyya residents, the authors consult exclusively IDF sources 
including a tweet that accuses Hamas of ordering the civilians to stay put “in the line of 
fire” (see Examples 5 and 11).  
 
In terms of the visual, Haaretz uses an image from a television report of Shuja’iyya by al-
Aqsa TV which is a Hamas-run news network.  
 
 
 
Picture 4: Image of Shuja’iyya in Haaretz’s news article (Pfeffer 2014b) 
 
The image depicts three corpses lying on the ground which are likely to be of children. 
Graphic photographs are meant to disturb, the aim of which is to provoke emotions, 
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feelings and reactions. The use of such an image to describe carnage, even when it is made 
blurry, is rare in a news outlet with a liberal reputation like Haaretz. But the fact that the 
image is retrieved from a television channel owned by Hamas, the so-called Enemy of the 
state of Israel, and at the high time of war, undoubtedly implies an ideological choice. It 
befits the storyline which questions the narratives presented by both Israeli forces and 
Hamas that the author remarks as “hotly contested versions” of reality (Pfeffer 2014b).  
 
On the other hand, CNN’s article (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014) does not enclose any 
specific visual medium of Shuja’iyya. The article, however, is accompanied by a video clip 
discussing news of an Israeli soldier suspected to be captured by Hamas (see Picture 5).  
 
 
 
Picture 5: Screenshot of the main video of CNN’s article (Levs, Brumfield and 
Penhaul 2014) 
 
The fact that the story of the missing Israeli soldier occurs highest in the relevance 
structure, meaning that it is among the latest news and reported first in the article, may 
explain for the use of the video. The video tells details of the suspected capture of an Israeli 
soldier that Hamas claims responsibility whereas Israeli authorities deny the claims. It 
includes a footage from al-Aqsa TV which features a moving image of a Hamas 
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spokesperson. Interestingly, it can also be seen that both outlets make use of materials from 
the same Hamas’ television channel, though on different subjects, as one is about 
Shuja’iyya while the other about the missing Israeli soldier. Additionally, the visual 
representation of a Hamas member in CNN’s main video, fully covered, muted, in the 
background, is also an ideological construction. The representations of the organization will 
be analyzed in depth in the fifth section of this chapter.  
 
Overall, the most notable differences in the way that the two outlets cover the battle of 
Shuja’iyya (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014; Pfeffer 2014b) are in terms of casualty 
reporting and how the news story is presented in the relevance structures of the articles. 
First, there are discrepancies in the statistics of casualties of both Palestinian civilians and 
Palestinian militants as presented on Haaretz and CNN, which raises questions on the dead: 
whether they were militants or civilians. As the conflation of civilians with militants is 
central to the disputes surrounding the war, it is important to take into consideration these 
discrepancies as they might imply the outlets’ different views on the matter. Additionally, 
whereas Haaretz refrains from quoting the figure of civilian casualties, suggesting the idea 
that exact statistics were not available at the time of reporting (see Example 14), CNN has 
different ways in presenting the deaths on both Palestinian and Israeli sides (see Examples 
7 and 8).  
 
Second, the news story on Shuja’iyya occupies different positions in the two outlets’ 
articles. While news concerning Shuja’iyya remains the major macroproposition in the 
Haaretz article (Pfeffer 2014b), it only occupies two over seven parts in total in the CNN 
article (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014). Both the headline and the main video of the 
CNN article are devoted to another topic which is the missing Israeli soldier suspected to be 
captured by Hamas (see p.83 and p.89). These differences certainly indicate the preferred 
news values of Haaretz and CNN as it is necessary to emphasize that both articles are 
published on the same day, July 20. 
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6.4 Rhetoric of Terrorist Stronghold: When is a House not a Home?  
 
Much controversy surrounding the 2014 Gaza war is over the targets of civilians and 
residential areas. What is considered to be legally permissible at the time of war is when 
conflict parties attack the other’s military targets, while taking cautionary measures to 
avoid any civilian casualties (Gross 2014). Crossing that line equals the possibility of 
committing war crimes. Both Israeli forces and Hamas have been condemned for their 
military actions and there is also evidence pointing to indiscriminate attacks against 
civilians from both sides (UNHRC 2015: 19). As the analysis of the battle of Shuja’iyya in 
the previous section demonstrates, Israel consistenly used the rhetoric of a “terror 
infrastructure”, a “source of terror” to legitimize its airstrikes and artillery on Gaza 
neighborhoods (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014; Pfeffer 2014b). In the midst of the 
fighting in July 2014, IDF released posters with the headlines: “When is a house a home? 
And when does it become a legitimate military target?” and “In Shuja’iyya” (see Appendix 
2 and Appendix 3). The posters show pictures of a fully-functional residential house with a 
bedroom, a living room and oddly, an operation room, a weapon storage and a commander 
center. The posters are apparently a product of propaganda, the rhetoric of which has 
nevertheless been widely disseminated and mass-mediatized. All in all, the controversy 
surrounding the conflict as well the major blame-game between Hamas and Israel raise 
questions on the fine line that distinguishes a civilian from a militant.  
 
The four articles selected for analysis cover different incidents in which a Gaza hospital, a 
residential house, a U.N. facility and a U.N. shelter were struck by Israeli airstrikes (Cohen, 
Hass and Khoury 2014; Hass 2014a; Martinez July 23rd 2014; Penhaul, Payne and Fantz 
July 25th 2014). From Table 8, it can be seen that the sites targeted by airstrikes are 
referred to by a number of lexical choices, the majority of which are cited from Israeli 
official sources.  
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Table 8: Lexicon describing target sites of bombardment  
 
Outlet Site Lexical choices 
Haaretz  
(Cohen, Hass and 
Khoury 2014) 
al-Wafa 
hospital 
compound, Hamas command center, rocket-launching 
site, launching point, closed military zone 
Haaretz  
(Hass 2014a) 
A residential 
house 
IDF target, home, house of a Hamas’ senior 
commander 
CNN 
(Martinez 2014) 
U.N. school shield, Hamas institution, vacant school 
CNN 
(Penhaul, Payne 
and Fantz 2014) 
U.N. shelter shelter 
 
As can be seen in Table 8, the example in CNN’s article on the bombing of the U.N. shelter 
(Penhaul, Payne and Fantz 2014) is the only case among the four articles that does not have 
a diversity of lexical choices, as the word “shelter” in reference to “the U.N. shelter” is the 
only lexical option applied throughout the article. On the other hand, in Haaretz’s news 
item on the bombing of the al-Wafa hospital in Gaza, the hospital is labelled in accordance 
with Israeli official source as “a compound”, “a Hamas command center”, “a rocket-
launching site” and “a closed military zone” (Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014). Such lexical 
options effectively impose on the hospital a number of militarized characteristics, turning it 
into a legitimate military target as opposed to its generally assumed notion of a place where 
the sick and the vulnerable are medically treated.  
 
(15) The Israel Defense Forces said the strike was aimed at “specific terror 
targets within the hospital compound.” It said Hamas operatives had fired at 
IDF forces in recent days from the compound, using light weapons and anti-
tank fire “which increased in recent hours, endangering our troops.” (Cohen, 
Hass and Khoury 2014) 
 
(16) The hospital was empty, after its patients and medical staff had left on July 
17. Contrary to reports, militants had not been in the hospital before its 
evacuation. (Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014) 
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(17)  Al-Wafa Hospital is Gaza’s only rehabilitation hospital and most of its 
patients were disabled, paralyzed or in a coma, without relatives to look after 
them and in need of constant care and supervision. (Cohen, Hass and 
Khoury 2014) 
 
“Contrary to [IDF] reports” that the hospital had been used by Hamas as a “compound” to 
fire at Israeli forces in recent days (see Example 15), Haaretz notes that the hospital had 
been in fact emptied since July 17 and it had not been used by Hamas operatives (see 
Example 16). The article further adds that the al-Wafa hospital is the only habilitation 
center in Gaza for disabled, paralyzed patients or those in a coma (see Example 17). Should 
the fact that the site was a hospital for the sick and had not been used by Hamas invalidate 
the quality of it being a legitimate military target? The IDF’s arbitrary declaration of the 
hospital as a “closed military zone” (see Table 8) denotes certain meaning: that anyone 
staying in the area is a militant, thus can be bombed, shot and killed. This ideologically-
controlled vocabulary mostly appears in quotes from Israeli official sources while the 
authors of the article choose to refer to the subject in depiction as “al-Wafa hospital” or 
simply “the hospital” (Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014).  
 
In the same vein, the residential house featured in other Haaretz’s article (Hass 2014a) and 
the U.N. school depicted in CNN’s article (Martinez 2014) are described as having 
connection to Hamas. While the residential house featured in Haaretz is referred to by the 
author as an “IDF target” or more specifically, house of a Hamas’ senior commander (Hass 
2014a), the U.N. school depicted in CNN’s article appears in an indirect quote of an Israeli 
source as a “shield”, a Hamas “institution”.  
 
(18) The Issa house was undoubtedly an IDF target: Marwan Issa is a senior 
commander in Hamas’ military wing, apparently the heir of Ahmed Jabari, 
whom Israel assassinated in 2012. But Marwan didn’t live there with his 
parents and brothers — eight families in all, totaling 55 people. He was 
hiding out somewhere in Gaza, as the Israeli security services knew very 
well. (Hass 2014a) 
 
(19) Tuesday’s discovery of rockets hidden in a vacant U.N. facility is the sort of 
evidence that Israel cites when it accuses Hamas of using civilians and their 
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institutions as shields in the ongoing Gaza conflict. The rockets were found 
in a vacant school between two other U.N. schools being used as shelters for 
3,000 displaced Palestinians, the United Nations said. (Martinez 2014) 
 
In Example 18, the author of Haaretz’s article attempts to explain the reason behind the 
bombing of the house belonging to the Issa family, confirming that the house was 
undoubtedly “an IDF target” because its family members have ties to Marwan Issa, “a 
senior commander of Hamas’ military wing”, “the heir of Ahmed Jabari” (Hass 2014a). At 
the same time, the author also adds that Marwan did not stay in the house and was in 
hiding, a fact that Israeli intelligence was well aware of. It ultimately raises the question of 
what the purpose of bombing the house of eight families was. Later in the article, the author 
then goes on to question the reasons behind the bombings of other residential houses in the 
area:     
 
(20) Why was the house of someone who just joined Hamas’ military wing a 
month ago treated like the houses of its senior leaders? Was another house 
bombed because one brother works for a Turkish company? The family says 
it can’t think of any other “incriminating” factor. (Hass 2014a) 
 
The author addresses the “why” question of the bombing by quoting the Issa family who 
attribute it to an “incriminating factor” (Hass 2014a), suggesting that the Issa house, along 
with other residential houses, were bombed as punitive measures for simply being relatives 
to Hamas members. 
 
The idea that any site connected to Hamas is at the risk of being destroyed is further 
affirmed in Example 19 in CNN’s article on the bombing of a U.N. school (Martinez 2014), 
in which the author by contrast asserts that there was evidence of rockets being hidden in 
the U.N. facility, meaning that it had previously been used by Hamas. An important detail 
that must be pointed out here is that the author indirectly refers to the U.N. school as a 
“shield”, “their” institution even though the U.N. school was in reality a public property. 
The fact that U.N. schools, according to the author, were used as shelters for displaced 
Palestinians makes them effective human “shields” for Hamas against Israeli airstrikes and 
to hide their rockets. But the act of referring to the school as their institution essentially 
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associates the school to the group, suggesting that the school is an example, a 
representation of such Hamas institutions. This is a dangerous lexical choice because it 
turns the site into a legitimate military target, backing up Israel’s claims that Hamas used 
human shields to protect their missiles and creating a diversion that the blame should be 
placed on them, Hamas, not Israeli forces who bombed the school.  
 
Two articles from both news outlets chosen for this section take on rather interesting 
perspectives (Martinez 2014; Hass 2014a). Haaretz’s article dated July 29, 2014 is a news 
story about a Palestinian family whose house was destroyed by Israeli airstrikes (Hass 
2014a). The article discusses the dispute surrounding Israeli forces’ attack on residential 
areas, as the author narrates the news story from the perspective of a Palestinian civilian.  
 
(21) “Now my oldest son, aged 4, asks me, ‘When are we going home?’” Raid 
said. “I took him to the ruined house, and he asked me, ‘Who broke the 
house?’ I told him the planes of the Israelis. He asked me why, and I told 
him they ‘broke’ ours like they broke others. He’s always asking how this 
could be. And then he told me, ‘I’ll break the Israelis’ house like they broke 
my house.’” (Hass 2014a) 
 
The article tells the story of the Issa family whose house was struck because they happen to 
be related to a senior commander of Hamas’ military wing, even though the latter did not 
even live there. Given the prevalent reports of the tit for tat between Hamas and Israeli 
forces, such insight into the voices of civilians, who suffer from the fighting and exchange 
of fires, is rare. It also raises critical questions on the tactics and the methods of IDF in 
targeting personal dwellings, as well as their systematic conflation of Gaza’s innocents with 
Hamas.  
 
The CNN’s article dated July 23, 2014, by contrast, looks from the viewpoint of the Israeli 
Ambassador to the U.S. (Martinez 2014). The Israeli official’s narrative of the same 
subject, cited in the main video of the article, shows a rather conflicting view.  
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(22) “They [Hamas] are putting missiles, military command center in hospital, 
for crying out loud. That’s something that the world should be outraged 
about, not outraged at Israel for defending itself against this rocket attack.” 
(Video, Martinez 2014) 
 
In the extract from the CNN’s interview with the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., the Israeli 
official emphasizes that by targeting areas qualified as military targets even when they are 
hospitals or residential homes, We, meaning Israel, are only defending ourselves, thus 
Israel should not be made responsible for the civilian casualties, while Them, meaning 
Hamas, is using civilians as human shields. This exclusive interview with a high-rank 
Israeli official by CNN indicates an inclination towards an official narrative of one party 
involved.   
 
The official rhetoric leads the public to believe that civilians were killed because they 
formed the “human shield” in order to protect Hamas, signifying that they were part of the 
war effort, which in turns downplays their deaths. In the video, the Israeli Ambassador then 
goes on saying that “If human shield is an effective strategy, it will be used again and 
again” (Martinez 2014), implying that it was imperative for Israel to bombard such 
residential areas to dismantle Hamas’ strategy. When asked to address the controversy over 
how the international media have been accused of being complicit in Hamas’ propaganda 
effort by broadcasting pictures of Palestinian civilian deaths, the Ambassador replies:  
 
(23) Hamas intends to harm Palestinian civilians and to harm Israeli civilians. 
The more civilians they kill, the better for them. [...] The media is different; 
the media is obviously looking for a story. You have these heart-wrenching 
photos, these Palestinian civilians who were killed. You have four kids who 
were killed on the beach. [...] When I see a picture like that, it’s very hard. 
But in placing the blame on Israel, they are unwittingly complicit to what 
Hamas is trying to do. (Video, Martinez 2014) 
 
What one can observe is an apparent concession, followed by an apparent denial of 
responsibility. When being questioned about the high number of civilian deaths who were 
caught in the crossfires between the two forces, the Israeli official admits that it was 
difficult to see such photos of Palestinians who were killed but in the end it is Hamas who 
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should be placed the blame on, for “Hamas intends to harm Palestinian civilians” (see 
Example 23). The antagonistic tones and the dehumanization of the Enemy coming from a 
representative of the Israeli government is no surprise. The issue is in how these claims are 
evaluated, how they are presented to the public. By paying extensive attention and 
emphasizing their hyperbolic negative actions or alleged threats, elite groups can 
marginalize, discredit the voices of less dominant groups (van Dijk 1993: 264), as in this 
case, of Them, Hamas and Them, the civilians.  
 
It comes to the press to decide from which angle the readers should be looking in and how 
the events or actors in depiction should be represented to the mass. Throughout CNN’s 
article on the subject of human shields (Martinez 2014), Israeli official narratives prevail 
ordinary voices, building up what van Dijk calls a “segregated” structure of discourse 
where opinions of less dominant groups are not heard (van Dijk 1993: 260). Still there is 
apparent effort to include testimonies from the Palestinian side which are often obscurely 
and interchangeably cited as “Palestinian leaders” or “Palestinians”, two concepts that 
denote completely different meanings.  
 
(24) The geography and population density of Gaza further clouds efforts to 
determine whether civilian casualties are part of Hamas strategy of using 
human shields or collateral damage from Israel’s ground and aerial assaults, 
Palestinians say. (Martinez 2014) 
 
(25) What complicates the dispute over alleged human shields – an offense 
against international law – is how Hamas is also a political organization 
embedded in civilian life in the Palestinian territory, Palestinian leaders say. 
(Martinez 2014) 
 
These lexical choices, “Palestinians” and “Palestinian leaders”, can create confusion over 
who these Palestinians and Palestinian leaders are. Senior members of the Palestinian 
Authority are considered as Palestinian leaders, but senior members of Hamas are too 
Palestinian leaders. At the same time, Palestinian civilians and their politicians might share 
different perspectives regarding the issue. Considering the ideological and political 
distinctions among the Palestinian conflict actors including Hamas, the Palestinian 
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Authority and Palestinian civilians, more attention should have been paid to avoid such 
conflation.  
 
All in all, it can be seen that the outlets’ choices to tell the same story but from very 
different angles give practical insight into the subject. It is interesting to see how an author 
of an Israeli press (Hass 2014a) attempts to put herself in the shoes of Palestinian civilians 
whose opinions are often censored and neglected, so as to look at the war from a different 
picture. On the other hand, throughout the CNN’s article (Martinez 2014), it can be seen 
that the information is largely supported by official sources (see Examples 23 and 25) 
rather than eyewitness accounts. According to van Dijk, such construction of “surface” 
structure is regulated by rules which may be institutional, and which enables an “unofficial 
exercise of power” (1993: 261). Discourse control is an enactment of power (ibid. 261), and 
when an outlet is highly dependent on official narratives to construct the story, it insinuates 
the idea that some sources should be more prioritized and some narratives are more 
credible.  
 
By selecting one perspective over another, the outlet already takes a position when telling 
the war story. In fact, in the CNN’s article on the use of human shields in Gaza (Martinez 
2014), the author constructs several reasons backing up Israel’s claims that Hamas used 
human shields in Gaza so that the killing of  Palestinian civilians was unintentional.   
 
(26) Measuring such bloodshed is “very difficult because Hamas is using them, 
Palestinians, as human shields,” Netanyahu told CNN. (Martinez 2014) 
 
(27) “Hamas is not just an isolated, you know, sort of armed individuals. [..] if 
you are going to destroy everything related to Hamas as a party, as a 
movement, it means that you're going to go on the rampage against families, 
homes, hospitals, schools and social services,” Ashrawi said. (Martinez 
2014) 
 
(28) Israel has accused Hamas of using human shields in previous conflicts in 
Gaza. Also, in 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon with the intention of 
destroying the PLO, it accused PLO combatants of using civilians as human 
shields in that conflict, too [sic]. (Martinez 2014) 
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As can be seen in Example (24), (25), (26), and (27), the factors that can explain the high 
toll of Palestinian civilian deaths in Gaza are: its geography, population density, civic 
presence and the use of human shields by Hamas. At the end of the article, the author 
includes the fact that Israel had previously accused Hamas and the PLO of using human 
shields in previous conflicts (see Example 28), suggesting that these incidents set a 
precedent to the 2014 war where the question of human shields is once again raised. 
According to the author, these factors altogether make civilian casualties “inevitable” 
(Martinez 2014). The construction of such discourse effectively puts the blame on external 
factors and completely removes Israeli forces’ responsibility and involvement in the 
civilian casualties.  
 
The media reports of IDF’s issue of warnings prior to many of its airstrikes should also be 
noted. Two articles from both news outlets, one about the bombardment of the U.N. shelter 
(Penhaul, Payne and Fantz 2014), the other about the bombardment of a residential house 
(Hass 2014a), put the matter in perspective.  
 
(29) The IDF said it had told people at the school to evacuate because of the 
fighting in the area and given a four-hour window to get people out. Israeli 
officials told CNN they had warned U.N. officials for three days to 
evacuate. (Penhaul, Payne and Fantz 2014) (emphasis added) 
 
(30) At 1:30 A.M. on Wednesday, July 16, the Azara family’s cell phone rang. 
The mother answered, and quickly hung up in fright. Then Samer Azara’s 
phone rang, and the 26-year-old police officer answered.  
 
The caller, Azara related, introduced himself as David from the Israel 
Defense Forces and told him in good Arabic: “You have three minutes to 
leave your house. I intend to launch a missile at the Issa house, your 
neighbors. What’s most important is that you remove the children; I don’t 
care about the adults.” (Hass 2014a) (emphasis added) 
 
In Example (29), CNN reports a statement of Israeli officials saying that they had notified 
the U.N. officials three days prior to the bombardment of the U.N. shelter. Yet at least 
sixteen civilians were killed in this airstrike, many more severely wounded (Penhaul, Payne 
and Fantz 2014). By contrast, in the Haaretz’s article, Azara, a Palestinian civilian whose 
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house was destroyed by Israeli airstrikes, recounted a phone call from an IDF official 
notifying that his family had three minutes to leave the house (see Example 30). There is an 
interesting analogy in the two stories whereby the aspect of time is a significant variable in 
the construction of the news. Given three days, one might have enough time to prepare for 
the evacuation whereas given three minutes, there is simply no time. But then a question 
also stems from the first incident (see Example 29) is that if the U.N. shelter was given 
enough amount of time to evacuate, why were there still so many civilian deaths? These 
aspects are missing in the CNN’s article which refrains from questioning the contradiction 
in IDF’s claims.  
 
Later in the Haaretz’s news story (Hass 2014a), the author reveals that many houses were in 
fact destroyed without any prior warnings.  
 
(31) Some houses have been bombed with no prior warning, with all their 
inhabitants still inside, for reasons incomprehensible to those relatives who 
survived. (Hass 2014a) 
 
The decision to tell the story from the perspectives of Palestinian civilians whose houses 
were bombarded by Israeli airstrikes indicates the position of the author, who chooses to 
look at the issue of warnings in a critical light. As Examples (30) and (31) might suggest, in 
the end, the aim of these arbitrary issues of warning seems to be that Israeli forces would be 
cleared of responsibility over anyone who chooses to remain in the targeted sites because 
they would then automatically assume the status of non-civilian. 
 
 
6.5 Hamas 
 
In a press conference that took place during the escalation of the Gaza war 2014, Israeli 
president Benjamin Netanyahu attempted to justify the ongoing battles in Gaza against 
Hamas’ leaders by referring to Hamas as part of a network of Islamist terror groups 
including the Islamic State, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda, calling them “branches of the same 
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tree”, “the savagery”, “the enemies of all civilized countries” (Times of Israel 2014). What 
then slipped into the political lexicography of this particular conflict is a confrontation 
between the good and the evil, the civilized and the barbaric, a war against terror between 
Israel, often portrayed as a democratic, Western-friendly country in the Middle East and 
Hamas which is a terrorist organization as designated by Israel and Western countries 
(Mullen and Todd 2014). Suddenly the war sounds just when it is represented as a global 
fight against terrorism (Fattal 2014). Here the Enemy, Hamas, being grouped with ISIS and 
Hezbollah, automatically acquires the same category. The implication here is that, since 
there has been a massive campaign against the terror of ISIS across the globe, it makes 
sense to conquer Hamas in the same vein. With that being said, four articles from both 
news outlets (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b; Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014) will be 
analyzed in this section in order to learn about how the media portray one of the main 
actors of this conflict, Hamas, given such preconceived assumptions of the organization.  
 
As previously suggested, the conflation between “militant” and “civilian” can turn the 
innocents into part of the war effort, making them specific targets by the armed groups 
fighting in this war (see subchapter 6.4). The case is on the contrary for Hamas which is 
considered as a terrorist group by both Israel and the U.S. Given the position and the 
relationship that both news outlets maintain with the conflict actors, one can infer that the 
use of the word “terrorist” of both news outlets when depicting Hamas is not simply the 
result of an evaluative categorization but a conscious ideological choice. 
 
Table 9: Lexicon depicting Hamas and their members  
 
Outlet Date  Lexical choices 
Haaretz 
(Bar’el 2014a) July 8 
organization, sole ruler of the Gaza strip, terrorist organization, 
Hamas government, Hamas leadership 
Haaretz 
(Bar’el 2014b) July 15 
militant, armed wing, military wing, group, PA’s military wing, 
Hezbollah, authority 
CNN 
(Mullen and 
Todd 2014) 
July15 
movement, monolith, group, military wing, the resistance, 
rebellion, terrorists, Palestinian militant group, political arms, 
military arms, the Osama bin Laden of Hamas, movement of 
102 	
resistance, Islamic resistance movement, military force, 
fighters, military commanders, in Iran’s good books 
CNN 
(Castillo 2014) July 23 
organization, terrorist organization, the resistance, faction, 
operatives, militants, political wing, cadres  
 
As can be seen in Table 9, the references of Hamas and its members to “terrorist” are 
mentioned once in the texts on the organization (Bar’el 2014a; Castillo 2014; Mullen and 
Todd 2014), with the exception of Haaretz’s article dated July 15 where the lexical choice 
is absent (Bar’el 2014b). In both news outlets (Bar’el 2014b; Mullen and Todd 2014), 
Hamas’ status as being a terrorist organization with an infamy compared to that of 
Hezbollah and al-Qaeda is axiomatically assumed, as a matter of course. The Western 
definition of “terrorist” is strongly associated to Islamic fundamentalism and extremism, 
and here it is in reference to a group of people who is radicalized and uses violence against 
Israeli occupation of Palestine (van Dijk 1995a: 260). Such consistent lexicalizations of the 
Palestinian armed group no doubt spell out the authors’ ideological positions of the conflict 
actors (ibid. 260). The two CNN articles begin with an assumption of the group being a 
terrorist organization before adding that they call themselves “the resistance” or 
“movement of resistance”, both in quotation mark (Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014).  
 
In the CNN’s article that introduces the profiles of Hamas’ leadership (Mullen and Todd 
2014), Hamas appears as a weak, outlawed, Iranian-backed group who uses violence to 
vindicate their ideology and achieve their goal which is “to fight Israel”, as seen in 
Examples 32 and 33.  
 
(32) “The Qataris, who are backing him now, are not able to provide the military 
expertise and training on rockets and drones that the military wing needs to 
fight Israel,” he said. “These are things that only the Iranians can provide.” 
(Mullen and Todd 2014) 
 
(33) Khaled Elgindy, who was a former adviser to the Palestinian Authority, said 
Hamas is in one of the weakest positions it’s been in in several years. […] 
And that weakened position, he says, is fueling the military wing’s 
belligerence. (Mullen and Todd 2014) 
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In both CNN’s articles (Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014), much attention is paid to 
Hamas’ military wing as it is referred to by a range of lexical options such as “military 
arms”, “military force”, “military commanders”, “fighters”, “operatives” and “cadres” (see 
Table 9). The diversity of lexicon depicting the group points out that neither its military 
wing nor its political wing is “monolith”, as stated in the CNN article on the profiles of its 
leaders (Mullen and Todd 2014). The main topic of the article is in fact to discuss who is in 
charge of Hamas, whether it is its military wing or its political wing. At the end of the 
article, the author quotes a former adviser to the PA who suggests that the “weakened 
position” of Hamas in the recent years might be attributed to the rise of its military wing, Iz 
al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which is responsible for the physical confrontation with Israel 
(see Example 33).  
 
On the other hand, Hamas on Haaretz seems to appear in a slightly different manner. Even 
when Hamas is called out as a terrorist group at some point (Bar’el 2014a), they are 
portrayed as a fully-functioning organization with a leadership appointed to separately 
coordinate a military wing and a political wing.  
 
(34) The abductions caught Hamas during a period that put its political strength 
to a severe test, when it turned out that the new unity government did not 
intend to pay the salaries of most Hamas government employees in Gaza 
[...]. (Bar’el 2014a) 
 
(35) The rebellion of the Hamas government officials made it clear to the 
organization’s leadership that as a result of the reconciliation its control over 
the funding of its supporters is in danger. (Bar’el 2014a) 
 
(36) [...] Hamas, until the reconciliation with Fatah, was seen as a separate 
authority that couldn’t influence the Palestinian Authority. (Ba’rel 2014b) 
 
Throughout both Haaretz’s articles (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b), Hamas is frequently 
represented as a “government” (two times) and an “authority” (one time). Both articles also 
discuss the relationship that the group maintains with the Palestinian Authority (see 
Examples 34, 35, 36) as the author refers to their coalition as a “unity government”. There 
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is a an emphasis on the group’s political effort in reconciling with the PA and a number of 
political and financial problems that Hamas faced due to this new coalition. Such 
lexicalizations of the group highlight the diplomatic and political issues involved, as the 
author argues that these political complications led to the escalation in the conflict between 
Hamas and Israel (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b).  
 
In the second Haaretz article on Hamas’ goals out of a ceasefire with Israel (Bar’el 2014b), 
however, the role of its military wing appears more clearly.  
 
(37) [...] if Hamas’ military wing doesn’t agree to it, the cease-fire will be a 
theoretical exercise in a strategy of mini-conflicts. (Ba’rel 2014b) 
 
(38) Now Hamas looks like the PA’s military wing. In this way, it resembles 
Hezbollah, which thanks to its military might and private conflict with Israel 
can dictate Lebanon’s domestic and foreign policy. (Ba’rel 2014b) 
 
The comparison of Hamas with “the PA’s military wing” and Hezbollah is ideological (see 
Example 38). It implies the power of the military wing in terms of control and decision-
making that according to the author, resembles that of Hezbollah which is able to assert 
authority over Lebanon’s domestic and foreign policy owing to its conflict with Israel. With 
this interpretation, the function of Hamas’ political wing is comparable to that of the PA 
which exercises no independent power over the military due to its security coordination 
with Israel (Hass 2014b). Whereas in the CNN’s article (Mullen and Todd 2014), the 
question of who is in charge of Hamas remains unanswered, the author of the Haaretz’s 
article (Bar’el 2014b) affirms that it is Hamas’ military wing who is in charge, who has the 
right to say in the organization, as is clearly seen in Example (37).  
 
In terms of the propositional structures, Hamas is regularly associated with forbidden, 
terrorist actions, as well as being accused of having intentions to harm Palestinian and 
Israeli civilians. The CNN’s article on Hamas’ endgame of the war (Castillo 2014), in 
particular, is an example for this idea.  
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(39) “The goal of Hamas—the actual, overarching goal—is to terrorize the Jews 
of Israel, through mass murder, into abandoning their country,” Goldberg 
wrote. (Castillo 2014) 
 
(40)  Reports of civilian casualties in Gaza – without the context of rockets being 
fired at Israel – play into Hamas’ media strategy, he [CNN Middle East 
analyst and former Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Michael Oren] said. 
(Castillo 2014) 
 
As can be seen in Example 40, Hamas is purportedly accused of taking advantage of reports 
of civilian casualties as a “media strategy”, implying that the group is using the civilian 
death tolls to build up a legal and public ground so as to fend off Israel’s military actions. 
Both opinions denounce the group as deliberately harming Palestinian and Israeli civilians, 
using inflammatory hyperbole such as “to terrorize the Jews”, “through mass murder” (see 
Example 39). The author of the article then delivers a clean-cut description of Hamas’ 
endgame in Gaza which are outlined by the small headlines of the article (Castillo 2014). 
Compared with Haaretz’s article on the same subject, dated July 8, 2014 (Bar’el 2014a), 
there are discrepancies in what are perceived as Hamas’ goals out of this war as stated in 
CNN (Castillo 2014). 
 
Table 10: Hamas’ goals of the 2014 Gaza conflict (Bar’el 2014a; Castillo 2014) 
 
 Haaretz (Bar’el 2014a) CNN (Castillo 2014) 
1 The preservation of its status as the sole ruler of the Gaza Strip The destruction of Israel 
2 The solution to its economic crisis An end to the Israeli blockade 
3 The continued implementation of the reconciliation with Fatah and the PA The release of prisoners 
4 The improvement of its political standing Rally support at home 
5 A temporary cease-fire   
6 The end of further arrests of its activists in the West Bank  
7 The release of the prisoners freed in the Gilad Shalid deal   
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When juxtaposing what are mapped out on both news outlets as what Hamas wants from 
the war (Bar’el 2014; Castillo 2014), one can observe a number of differences. Haaretz 
(Bar’el 2014a) presents a rather in-depth analysis of Hamas’ demands, with an emphasis on 
the group’s struggle to address its economic and political problems which already faltered 
its reputation and put the funding of its supporters in danger. Facing such serious problems, 
Hamas’ military confrontation with Israel, according to the author, serves as an ad hoc 
solution to rehabilitate its political status (see Examples 41, 42 and 43).   
 
(41) Hamas did not order Operation Protective Edge. All these were in clear 
contrast to the interests that have guided Hamas so far. (Bar’el 2014a) 
 
(42) Operation Protective Edge, despite all the damage it is causing in Gaza, 
could as a result actually improve Hamas’ political standing for now. (Bar’el 
2014a) 
 
(43) [...] Hamas leadership is calling on all the organizations in the Gaza Strip to 
“unite in the face of the Israeli aggression”. [...] Hamas is incapable of 
enforcing its will over some of the organizations, and it has been dragged 
into a war situation because of the actions of the separatist organizations 
who started the rocket attacks in the first place. (Bar’el 2014a) 
 
At the same time, the author includes the group’s effort to push for a ceasefire with Israel, 
propounding the idea that it was “dragged into the war” because of other Palestinian 
separatist factions who had started firing rockets at Israel in the first place and that 
operation Protective Edge is not what Hamas “ordered” (see Examples 41 and 43). Even 
though such argumentation is analytical, hence, personal, it keeps Hamas’ appeal in 
perspective, signaling that what the group wants is not a war with Israel, which was not its 
primary intention, but rather long-term solutions to address its socio-economic issues and 
the continued implementation of the reconciliation with Fatah and the PA in the West 
Bank. Such an in-depth analysis certainly allows the author to be in the position to come to 
terms with Hamas’ practical demands. This is what Galtung means when he says that the 
basis of any political discussion on conflict is about the basic human needs (2009: 116), as 
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a result, it is necessary for the media to look at the issue in a broader social, political and 
economic context that controls and governs the conflict dynamics.  
 
As opposed to Haaretz, according to the author of the CNN’s article on Hamas’ endgame in 
Gaza (Castillo 2014), there are four goals that Hamas wants to reach (see Table 10). One 
can observe that the three goals which are, an end to Israeli blockade, the release of 
prisoners and rally support at home have been similarly discussed in Haaretz’s article (see 
Table 10). In particular, the goal to put an end to Israeli blockade corresponds to Hamas’ 
demand to solve its economic problem which in reality stems from this blockade (Castillo 
2014). On the other hand, the support at “home”, meaning both the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, would also bring about a rehabilitation of Hamas’ political status and standing in the 
area. And finally, the demand that Israel release Palestinian prisoners is also mentioned in 
details in Haaretz’s article (Bar’el 2014a).  
 
Aside from these three practical demands, the author of CNN’s article (Castillo 2014) 
reveals a catchline: Hamas wants the destruction of Israel.  
 
(44) This mission is written into the preamble of Hamas’ founding document: 
“Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it.” It’s 
a demand that is globally repudiated as outrageous. (Castillo 2014) 
 
(45) It is unrealistic for Hamas to think that it can somehow destroy Israel. As 
long as Hamas leaders latch on to that as an endgame, the result will be 
continued flare-ups for years to come. (Castillo 2014) 
 
The idea that Hamas wants to destroy the state of Israel comes from a charter of the 
organization’s founding document, according to the author of the article who later 
comments that such goal is simply “outrageous” and “unrealistic” (see Examples 44 and 
45). That Hamas wants to destroy Israel is a persuasive rhetoric frequently echoed by 
Israeli officials (see Examples 23 and 40) and here it is reiterated by the media. Such 
discourse formulates models of the proposition that Hamas is the threat to Israeli national 
security, hence, it should be eliminated, which is in line with what Israeli prime minister 
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Netanyahu meant when he called on greater international support for Israel’s battles against 
Hamas (Times of Israel 2014), as previously mentioned at the beginning of this subchapter. 
Regardless of the origin and authenticity of the statement, when such proposition is widely 
disseminated by the media and eventually accumulates to a cultural mass, it turns every act 
of the Enemy into a war effort, building up general negative attitudes towards them and 
implying that fighting against them, Hamas, is imperative.  
 
When the CNN’s discouse is juxtaposed to what is analyzed as Hamas’ practical demands 
from the conflict in Haaretz’s article (Bar’el 2014a), it appears as a myopic and inciting 
view. The article on Haaretz places focus on the group’s diplomatic and political efforts 
rather than its insistence on a physical duel with Israel, which in turns suggests that 
antagonistic propositions of the group can be avoided.  
 
Another important dimension of discourse semantics is the level of specificity and degree 
of completeness of discourse, in which the “irrelevant negative categorization” of the 
Enemy can effectively deligitimize their opinions or actions (van Dijk 1993: 275). In 
CNN’s article on the profiles of Hamas’ leaders (Mullen and Todd 2014), one can observe 
the overcompleteness of discourse when portraits of Hamas’ leaders are depicted:  
 
(46) “Despite his George Clooney-type looks, he’s very much a dangerous man 
because he aids and abets Hamas’ very destructive policies and strategy,” 
said Neri Zilber of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. While it’s 
not clear how much control Meshaal has over the military wing of the group, 
one Israeli official calls the 58-year-old “the Osama bin Laden of Hamas.” 
(Mullen and Todd 2014) (emphasis added) 
 
(47) The military wing is led by Mohammed Deif, a shadowy, savvy figure who 
analysts say has survived multiple Israeli assassination attempts. [...] It [the 
Qassam Brigades] says he took the name “Deif,” which means “guest,” 
because under the pursuit of Israeli security forces, “he kept moving from 
village to village and from place to place.” (Mullen and Todd 2014) 
(emphasis added) 
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In this CNN article (Mullen and Todd 2014), Khaled Meshal, or Meshaal, Hamas’ leader of 
its political wing, is portrayed as a “dangerous” man with “George Clooney-type looks”, 
“the Osama bin Laden of Hamas”, while Mohammed Deif, leader of al-Qassam Brigades, 
appears as a “shadowy, savvy figure” who took the name “Deif”, meaning “guest” in 
Arabic, because he moved from village to village to avoid Israel’s pursuit. These personal 
characteristics may be irrelevant but they hyperbolically add up to the representations of 
these figures. In the case of Khaled Meshal, for instance, the Hamas’ political leader is 
profiled as “the Osama bin Laden” of Hamas. Such is an ideological lexicalization hinged 
on preconceptions and stereotypes of Western definition of “terrorist”. It also implies that 
Hamas’ political wing is no less treacherous and threatening than its military wing, and that 
these figures, who may appear as simple, ordinary characters are in fact capable of 
“dangerous”, threatening acts (see Example 46). This dimension of discourse semantics by 
contrast does not appear on Haaretz’s articles on Hamas, which might partly be due to the 
fact that both of their articles (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b) do not focus individually on 
Hamas leadership.  
 
Photographs and videos of Hamas are included in both news outlets, as a result, it is 
important to look into their roles in the discourse. When considering the four articles 
chosen for this section (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b; Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014), 
there is a difference in terms of the way that the two outlets make use of the visual data 
such as images and videos. Haaret’z articles are more textually structured, as each news 
item is accompanied by only one photograph (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b). On the other 
hand, CNN’s articles (Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014) are more visually supported, 
as they each have one main video and other small videos in thumbnail with a layout 
similarly featured and analyzed in section 6.2.2 of this chapter (see Appendix 1).  
 
In the Haaretz’s article and the CNN’s article dated July 15, 2014 (Bar’el 2014b; Mullen 
and Todd 2014), images of Hamas’ armed wing Iz al-Din al-Qassam are featured. The 
image of Hamas used in Haaretz’s article about the prospects of the Hamas–Israel ceasefire 
(Bar’el 2014b) is captioned “Palestinian militants of Iz al-Din al-Qassam, Hamas’ armed 
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wing, Gaza Strip, in 2014” and credited to AFP. On the other hand, Picture 7 is a 
screenshot of the main video titled “Hamas explained” in a CNN article on the profiles of 
the group’s leaders (Mullen and Todd 2014). 
 
 
 
Picture 6: Image of Hamas used in Haaretz’s article (Bar’el 2014b) 
 
 
 
Picture 7: Screenshot of CNN’s main video on Hamas (Mullen and Todd 2014) 
111 	
In both images (see Pictures 6 and 7), the group appears masked, heavily armed and in the 
screenshot of the CNN’s video, a Hamas member seems to look directly at the camera, 
standing in stark contrast to a supporting crowd. The video in fact elaborates on Hamas and 
their goals, featuring almost exclusively images and details of activities of the al-Qassam 
Brigades (Mullen and Todd 2014). The use of these visual data in both news outlets 
displays an interest and attention to Hamas’ armed wing which is known to be responsible 
for the rockets at Israel. More importantly, the images are used in articles specifically about 
the organization (Bar’el 2014b; Mullen and Todd 2014), which signals the vital role of the 
armed wing in Hamas’ organizational structure. In this case, the armed wing represents the 
mass appeal of Hamas as a militant group whose tenacity borders on a will to fight against 
Israel. This ideological portrayal, if anything, only confirms the stereotypes of the Western 
descriptions of a “terrorist” group: Islamic, fanatic, fundamentalist, radicalized, armed.  
 
Additionally, in an extract of the CNN’s video, Hamas is introduced as a democratically-
elected government in Gaza and one of the first Islamist parties in the world to win political 
office, a fact refuted and unrecognized by Israel and many Western governments (Mullen 
and Todd 2014). One year into its elected office, the CNN’s presenter adds, Hamas 
published a charter calling for the destruction of Israel (Mullen and Todd 2014), a detail 
that has been previously analyzed in this section (see p.108). This goal is visualized by the 
news outlet, as seen in Picture 8.  
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Picture 8: Screenshot of CNN’s main video on Hamas (Mullen and Todd 2014) 
 
This graphic design of the Hamas’ goal to destroy Israel is notable. The image consists of a 
background which is a green shade symbolized as the color of Islam, along with white 
Arabic script, on the left-hand side of the image and the phrase “the destruction of Israel” 
capitalized and formatted in big font size on the right-hand side of the image. The Arabic 
script, which is known as the shahada or an Islamic creed, and the green shade are in fact 
components of Hamas’ official flag, as can also be seen in Picture 6. But the composition of 
all of these graphic elements, the green color, the shahada, the capitalized “The destruction 
of Israel”, leaves an impression that there is a connection between them. With this 
interpretation, the goal which is “the destruction of Israel” is not only associated with 
Hamas but also with Islam, insinuating the idea that the religion also represents a threat to 
Israel (see also Example 44).  
 
On the other hand, when describing Hamas’ political leader, Khaled Meshal, the two news 
outlets look from rather different perspectives (Bar’el 2014a; Mullen and Todd 2014). In 
the Haaretz’s article (Bar’el 2014a), Khaled Meshal appears charismatic, looking in another 
direction and surrounded by a number of supporters waving the Islamic flag which is also 
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the Hamas flag (see Picture 9). The image renders the representation of a leader who seems 
to be greatly supported by the mass. The choice to use such an image of the leader of 
Hamas’ political wing in this case is ideologically strategic. It goes well with the storyline 
(Bar’el 2014a) which discusses the details of Hamas’ political and diplomatic efforts to 
improve its standing not just internationally but also domestically.   
 
 
 
Picture 9: Image of Khaled Meshal on Haaretz (Bar’el 2014a) 
 
On the other hand, the CNN’s article on the profiles of Hamas’ leaders has a specific video 
devoted to Khaled Meshal, displayed in thumbnail at the sidebar and titled, “Israeli spies 
poisoned a Hamas leader” (Mullen and Todd 2014). The interaction of the video with the 
text and an image of Khaled Meshal screenshot from the video can be seen in the following 
pictures: 
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Picture 10: Screenshot of a part of CNN’s article (Mullen and Todd 2014) 
 
 
 
Picture 11: Screenshot of video featuring Khaled Meshal on CNN (Mullen and 
Todd 2014) 
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In Picture 11, the image of Khaled Meshal is juxtaposed to that of Osama bin Laden, the 
founder of al-Qaeda. The image is actually the visual illustration for what has been 
presented in Example 46, in which the former is referred to as the “Osama bin Laden of 
Hamas” by Israeli officials. In reality, the video tells details of the poison attempt of Khaled 
Meshal by Israeli agents in Jordan and how the fact that he survived the assassination 
radically changed his position from an unknown to a very popular leader.  
 
(48) Once he survived this attack, this leader who was previously virtually 
unknown became very popular. His stature goes straight to the top. He is a 
living model. (Video, Mullen and Todd 2014) 
 
The proposition that Khaled Meshal rose to his position today thanks to his survival of the 
assassination attempt, instead of his capability of leadership or any other skills, effectively 
delegitimizes his public appeal. At the same time, the comparison of Meshal with Osama 
bin Laden, as previously stated, presents an image of a dangerous man who has much 
influence over Hamas and is thus a threat to Israel. This portrayal of Meshal by Israeli 
officials might amount to propaganda, but the mass distribution of such an image by a 
mainstream international outlet can have a huge effect on readers and consequently 
contribute to the stereotypical representation of Hamas.  
 
The press images play an active role in shaping the visual representations of conflict actors. 
Throughout their coverage (Mullen and Todd 2014), these negative portrayals of Hamas 
and their leaders seem to be rather routine on CNN. Haaretz, on the other hand, resorts to 
less image-format depictions of the organization, which in turns is able to avoid ideological 
representations of the group.  
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7 CONCLUSION  
 
News from the Middle East has been frequently in the focus of international news reports 
throughout the past decade. The region meets all the necessary criteria earmarked for a 
front page’s feature: negativity (war/violence), elite nations (relations with the U.S.), 
ideological proximity (fight against terrorism), among many other economic and political 
interests (van Dijk 1988: 39). News is newsworthy when it is about elite people in elite 
countries, when it is personalized and negative, according to Galtung (2002: 262), which 
helps to explain the media’s fascination with any news related to the Israel–Palestine 
conflict.   
 
This study examines the coverage of the latest war in Gaza from two online news portals, 
Haaretz and CNN International. It focuses on the outlets’ approaches and reportage of the 
events taking place during the war, fixating on four topics: the onset of violence, the battle 
of Shuja’iyya, the rhetoric of terrorist stronghold and lastly, the representations of Hamas. 
Twelve articles, six from each news outlet, were analyzed using Teun van Dijk’s CDA 
framework for news discourses. The purposes were to find out how the events, the outbreak 
of the war and the battle of Shuja’iyya, are reported, how conflict actors including 
Palestinian civilians and Hamas are represented, and how news articles from Haaretz and 
CNN differ from one another in terms of the war/peace journalism perspectives. These 
were also the three research questions of this study. The assessment was based on an 
interest in knowing whether the media coverage of the war has been fair and if the outlets 
have been critically assessing the weights of different claims which emerged in the conflict 
and thereby, providing readers with accurate and authentic information. Thus within the 
scope of the study, the thematic and schematic structures of the news, dimensions of 
discourse semantics including lexical styles, perspectives, propositional structures, 
positions and level of specificity and degree of completeness, along with the visual data, 
were analyzed.  
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To begin with, what we have come to acknowledge so far is the differences in the way the 
outlets narrate the news stories on the outbreak of the war and the battle of Shuja’iyya 
(Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014; Magnay, Payne and Levs 2014; Pfeffer 2014a; Pfeffer 
2014b). In terms of structure, due to having a body of content usually constricted, CNN’s 
news topics are organized according to the principle of recency in which latest news occurs 
at the highest level of the thematic structure before other thematically relevant 
macropropositions. This is also reflective on CNN’s headlines and story highlights which 
seem to prioritize prominent news that express a salient quality rather than the main content 
of the news (see subchapter 6.2.1). This is an aspect where it differs from Haaretz which 
usually resolves to less shocking or startling news headlines, even though this is only an 
observation based on the headlines collected. Haaretz’ news articles are also structurally 
different, which sometimes follows a causality order (see subchapter 6.2.2).  
 
In terms of content, more than necessary attention is paid to the coverage of the duel, the 
series of exchange of fires, constant fighting and inflammatory verbal reactions from 
Hamas and Israel on the CNN’s coverage of the onset of the war (Magnay, Payne and Levs 
2014). Such is an approach on the low road, as defined by Galtung, which points to the 
media’s reportage of the battlefield where physical confrontation, violence, casualties from 
the two sides are put in the spotlight. It is one of the aspects that characterize sports-
archetypical war journalism. (Galtung 2002: 259) Even if reporting news and updates of the 
fighting is indispensable to the news media covering conflict, such perpetual focus on the 
tug of war between the two warring sides is avoidable. Haaretz, for instance, in their 
reportage of the first day of the war (Pfeffer 2014a), the author of the article places the 
focus on Hamas’ political and diplomatic efforts, while suggesting a number of possible 
solutions that can be applied to prevent the escalation of the situation. These are the 
dimensions lacking in the CNN’s reportage.  
 
On the other hand, the most prominent issues in the two outlets’ coverage of the battle of 
Shuja’iyya (see subchapter 6.3) are perspectives and casualty reporting. In CNN’s news 
article (Levs, Brumfield and Penhaul 2014), more priority is given to the official narratives, 
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while less attention is paid to the ordinary. There is an imbalance of reporting, especially in 
terms of casualties. The article first presents the fallen Israeli soldiers as individuals, rather 
an anonymous mass, before calling the figure of the Palestinians who were killed in the 
Israeli airstrikes. Throughout the CNN’s report of the event, official sources outweigh 
ordinary voices. It implies a systematic preference that entrusts official narratives with 
more credibility and higher values. The Haaretz’s article on the same event (Pfeffer 2014b) 
also has the same problem. Despite this fact, the article attempts to look at the event, the 
battle of Shuja’iyya, from both Palestinian and Israeli perspectives in order to present a 
broader picture of the conflict.   
 
In terms of the representations of conflict actors, the study takes an interest in the way 
Palestinian civilians and their dwellings are represented on both news outlets. As a result, 
articles on the military targets of what are normally deemed as safe spaces including a 
hospital, a home, a school and a shelter were selected in order to see how the rhetoric of 
terrorist stronghold is reflected on the news (see subchapter 6.4). In the analysis of the four 
articles, it emerges that these sites were considered by Israeli officials as legitimate military 
targets because of their connection to Hamas, whether it is a rehabilitation hospital alleged 
of firing Hamas’ rockets at Israel (Cohen, Hass and Khoury 2014), a civilian home with 
family ties to a Hamas senior member (Hass 2014a), or a U.N. school and a U.N. shelter 
suspected of storing Hamas’ missiles (Martinez 2014; Penhaul, Payne and Fantz 2014).  
 
In this analysis, the issue of perspectives once again emerges and proves to have a great 
influence on the way the stories are presented to readers. In one of the CNN articles 
selected for this part, the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. was interviewed to address the 
controversy over “human shields” (Martinez 2014). By contrast, in one of the two articles 
on Haaretz (Hass 2014a), the author positions herself in the place of a Palestinian civilian 
whose family relationship with a senior Hamas member led to a complete destruction of his 
home. According to the Israeli official, these residential areas were targeted because they 
formed the shields to protect Hamas from Israeli airstrikes (see p. 96–97). But according to 
the Palestinian civilian, the destruction of his home is an incrimination for simply being 
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related to a Hamas member (see p. 94–95). Interestingly, both stories reflect the 
polarization and contestation of narratives of this war. Borrowing the words of Hanna 
Arendt, it is this distinction “between soldiers and civilians, between army and home 
population, between military targets and open cities, upon which the Hague Convention’s 
definition of war crimes rested, that had been obsolete” (Arendt 1963: 256).  
 
Antagonistic representations of Hamas are also present on Haaretz and CNN’s articles 
about the organization (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b; Castillo 2014; Mullen and Todd 2014), 
which seem to be based on an editorial bias that takes such ideological, dichotomous 
lexicography and imagery for granted. Both of CNN’s articles (Castillo 2014; Mullen and 
Todd 2014) vent to rather inflammatory references when describing the organization, their 
leaders, their goals and actions. As previously examined (see subchapter 6.5), the word 
“terrorist” denotes a preconceived ethnic hierarchy and a popular propositional structure 
that suggests either you are with us, or you are with them, the “terrorists”. Hamas’ negative 
actions are consistently emphasized and overstated on CNN, while more subtle, moderate 
criticism is waged against IDF, Us, our side, even when it is responsible for the civilian 
casualties in Gaza. The fallout of this systematic and structural emphasis of the binary 
oppositions of the conflict, the Us and the Enemy, is the civilians who are ultimately caught 
in the salvo of air raids and missiles. The fact that Hamas is a terrorist organization is also 
recognized in both Haaretz articles (Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b) but more attention seems 
to be paid to the group’s political efforts rather than its physical duel with Israel.  
 
In spite of their assumed ideological positions, the two outlets represent rather distinctive 
approaches to conflict reportage, looking from the war/peace journalism perspectives. CNN 
seems to be more engrossed in the hostilities between Hamas and the IDF and the visible 
effects of the war (calamities, destruction, physical sufferings). Haaretz, on the other hand, 
is more critical in their reporting of the war. The outlet has raised a number of discussions 
that effectively put the conflict into perspective, as many of its articles question the 
legitimacy and legality of their government’s military actions in Gaza, challenging the 
official rhetoric of the war (see Bar’el 2014a; Hass 2014a; Pfeffer 2014b). It also focuses 
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more on the de-escalation of the war, by offering analyses on possible solutions of the 
ongoing conflict (see Bar’el 2014a; Bar’el 2014b; Pfeffer 2014a), as well as by bringing 
forth both the visible and invisible consequences that the war indicted on the lives of 
civilians (see Hass 2014a). Haaretz’s portraiture of Hamas and their members (Bar’el 
2014a) is also written in less antagonistic tones compared with that of CNN (Mullen and 
Todd 2014). Even when these Haaretz articles may only account for little changes, it 
presents creativity and efforts to avoid violence, implying that there are alternatives to a 
war between the warring sides.  
 
Due to the fact that only a handful of articles were selected for analysis, there exist certain 
limitations that should be acknowledged, one of which is first and foremost the size of the 
study. Throughout the fifty-day war, both news outlets publish a large volume of articles 
depicting the development of the conflict, not to mention articles in stages before and after 
the war which are indispensable for a comprehensive study on the role of the media during 
conflict. The colossal amount of articles made it very difficult for the process of data 
collection of this study which covers only four topics relating to the conflict. The process of 
collecting the data is itself intentional, hence subjective, but this is inevitable in such a 
qualitative study. As a result, the analysis of the data is grounded within the scope of this 
paper. In this way it is necessary to mention that the issues pointed out in the analyses and 
discussions of the articles from both news outlets might not be recurrent and consistent 
throughout their coverage of the 2014 Gaza war or any other previous Israel–Palestine 
conflict(s) for that matter.  
 
The study does, however, look specifically into the differences in the two outlets’ coverage 
of noted events as well as their representations of conflict actors. It gives an insight into 
how these differences in their approaches can result in different interpretations of the news, 
thus explains how the excessive attention invested into the duel between the assumed both 
sides of the war, Hamas and the IDF, can amount to what is defined as war journalism and 
more importantly, how dichotomized construction of conflict actors contributes to their 
stereotypical representations.  
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With that being said, the study argues that the media has an important role during conflict, 
urging more critical and comprehensive assessment of its works. Specifically, more 
attention should be paid to the binary and hierarchical construction of oppositions in 
conflict, as well as the importance of perspectives in shaping narratives. Further research is 
needed in order to address questions that derive from this study: How does the relationship 
that the media maintain with conflict actors influence their coverage of the conflict? What 
factors can affect international media in representing wars and conflicts? How does the 
geopolitics of information affect the media representations of conflict events and actors? 
Indeed, the third question is the one that needs to be taken into more consideration, given 
the predominant Western media representations of wars and conflicts. The fact remains that 
some conflicts receive more exposure and responses while others are undermined and 
neglected, which raises questions on the extent to which the media locate their priority of 
coverage (Puddephatt 2006: 6). The local media are also targets that need to be looked 
further into, especially when a majority of media research are devoted to studying 
international media. While the possibility of being mobilized to promote a partisan agenda 
is equally applied to all media, internationally or locally, the risk is even more so for the 
latter (ibid. 6), prompting a need to conduct more research into the role of local media 
during conflict.  
 
Thus any solution to a conflict must take into account the fact that the media are an integral 
part of conflict and have an intermediary role as a bridge between the warring sides. Once it 
is also established that reporting is a subjective activity, it should be accomplished with a 
sense of responsibility and sensitivity.  
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Appendix 2. IDF’s propaganda poster, “When is a house a home?” (Credit: IDF) 
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